Governments worldwide are developing sunshine policies that increase transparency in politics, where a key initiative is regulating lobbyists. Building on the pioneering first edition, this book updates its examination of all jurisdictions with regulations, from the Americas, Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Australia. Unlike any book, it offers unique insights into how the regulations compare and contrast against each other, offering a revamped theoretical classification of different regulatory environments and situating each political system therein. This edition innovatively considers different measurements to capture the robustness of lobbying laws in terms of promoting transparency and accountability. And, based on the authors’ experience of advising governments globally, it closes with a no-nonsense guide on how to make a lobbying law. This is of value to policymakers seeking to introduce or amend regulations, and lobbyists seeking to influence this process.

Examines the law and policy of financial regulation using a combination of conceptual analysis and strong empirical research.

A cumulative list of works represented by Library of Congress printed cards.

This examination of lobbying communities explores how interest group populations are constructed and how they influence politics and public policy. By examining how populations of interest groups are comprised, this work fills an important gap between existing theories of the origins of individual interest groups and studies of interest group influence. The population ecology model of interest communities developed here builds on insights first developed in population biology and later employed by organizational ecologists. The model's central premise is that it is the environmental forces confronting interest organizations that most directly shape the contours of interest populations. After examining the demography of interest organizations in the fifty American states, the population ecology model is used to account for variations in the density and diversity of their interest communities, the nature of competition among similar interest organizations to establish viable niches, and the impact of alternative configurations of interest communities on the legislative process and the policies it produces. These empirical findings suggest that the environment of interest communities is highly constraining, limiting their size, composition, and potential impact on politics. Virginia Gray is Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. David Lowery is Burton Craige Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

The passage of Citizens United by the Supreme Court in 2010 sparked a renewed debate about campaign spending by large political action committees, or Super PACs. Its ruling said that it is okay for corporations and labor unions to spend as much as they want in advertising and other methods to convince people to vote for or against a candidate. This book provides a wide range of opinions on the issue. Includes primary and secondary sources from a variety of perspectives; eyewitnesses, scientific journals, government officials, and many others.