Hypothetical thought involves the imagination of possibilities and the exploration of their consequences by a process of mental simulation. In this Classic Edition, Jonathan St B T Evans’ presents his pioneering Hypothetical Thinking Theory; an integrated theoretical account of a wide range of psychological studies on hypothesis testing, reasoning, judgement and decision making. Hypothetical Thinking Theory is built on three key principles and implemented in a version of Evans' well-known heuristic–analytic theory of reasoning. The central claim of this book is that this theory can provide an integrated account of apparently diverse phenomena including confirmation bias in hypothesis testing, acceptance of fallacies in deductive reasoning, belief biases in reasoning and judgement, biases of statistical judgement and numerous characteristic findings in the study of decision making. Featuring a reflective and insightful new introduction to the book, this classic edition discusses contemporary theory on cognitive biases, human rationality and dual-process theories of higher cognition. It will be of great interest to researchers, post graduates as well as advanced undergraduate students.

Hypothetical thought involves the imagination of possibilities and the exploration of their consequences by a process of mental simulation. In this Classic Edition, Jonathan St B. T. Evans presents his pioneering hypothetical thinking theory; an integrated theoretical account of a wide range of psychological studies on hypothesis testing, reasoning, judgement and decision making. Hypothetical thinking theory is built on three key principles and implemented in a version of Evans' well-known heuristic–analytic theory of reasoning. The central claim of this book is that this theory can provide an integrated account of apparently diverse phenomena including confirmation bias in hypothesis testing, acceptance of fallacies in deductive reasoning, belief biases in reasoning and judgement, biases of statistical judgement and numerous characteristic findings in the study of decision making. Featuring a reflective and insightful new introduction to the book, this Classic Edition discusses contemporary theory on cognitive biases, human rationality and dual-process theories of higher cognition. It will be of great interest to researchers, post graduates as well as advanced undergraduate students.

This volume explores abductive cognition, an important but, at least until the third quarter of the last century, neglected topic in cognition. It aims at increasing knowledge about creative and expert inferences.

The purpose of this special issue is to present several research perspectives on learning trajectories with the intention of encouraging the broader community to reflect on, better define, adopt, adapt, or challenge the concept. The issue begins by briefly introducing learning trajectories. The remaining articles provide elaboration, examples, and discussion of the construct. They purposefully are intended to be illustrative, exploratory, and provocative with regard to learning trajectories construct; they are not a set of verification studies.

The human imagination manifests in countless different forms. We imagine the possible and the impossible. How do we do this so effortlessly? Why did the capacity for imagination evolve and manifest with undeniably manifold complexity uniquely in human beings? This handbook reflects on such questions by collecting perspectives on imagination from leading experts. It showcases a rich and detailed analysis on how the imagination is understood across several disciplines of study, including anthropology, archaeology, medicine, neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and the arts. An integrated theoretical-empirical-applied picture of the field is presented, which stands to inform researchers, students, and practitioners about the issues of relevance across the board when considering the imagination. With each chapter, the nature of human imagination is examined - what it entails, how it evolved, and why it singularly defines us as a species.

This book is a provocative and invigorating real-time exploration of the future of human evolution by two of the world’s leading interdisciplinary ecologists – Michael Charles Tobias and Jane Gray Morrison. Steeped in a rich multitude of the sciences and humanities, the book enshrines an elegant narrative that is highly empathetic, personal, scientifically wide-ranging and original. It focuses on the geo-positioning of the human Self and its corresponding species. The book's overarching viewpoints and poignant through-story examine and powerfully challenge concepts associated historically with assertions of human superiority over all other life forms. Ultimately, The Hypothetical Species: Variables of Human Evolution is a deeply considered treatise on the ecological and psychological state of humanity and her options – both within, and outside the rubrics of evolutionary research – for survival. This important work is beautifully presented with nearly 200 diverse illustrations, and is introduced with a foreword by famed paleobiologist, Dr. Melanie DeVore.

XVI Psychologists have, however, shown that what we are primarily aware of is not a succession of sense-data but figures-ground phenomena: Wittgenstein's ambiguous duck-rabbit is merely one such example. They have also drawn our attention to the existence of tertiary qualities in perception, such as 'symmetry' and 'elegance' which are just as directly given as are the perceived colours red, green or yellow. It is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty has made considerable use of Gestalt ideas in his Phenomenology of Perception. One of the commonest reasons given by linguistic philosophers for not making direct use of the results of psychological research (although philosophers are usually willing to accept the first-hand results of physical science) is that philosophical accounts of perception and thinking are concerned with analysing the language in which these reports are made; that is to say, they are second-order enquiries. Often this approach is still more restricted and ordinary linguistic usage is taken as the yardstick against which questions relating to thought and perception are to be measured. The task of the philosopher is then con fined to the analysis of ordinary language. If he is more adventurous, as some writers on philosophical psychology are, he might go on to show how far the language used by psychological researchers falls short of the paradigms of common sense.