The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl has decisively influenced much of contemporary philosophy. Yet Husserl's philosophy has come under such criticism that today it is viewed as little more than a historical relic. One of the most important and influential critiques of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology was launched by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time, which radically reinterpreted phenomenology. Timothy Stapleton returns to the origin of phenomenology to provide a clear, concise perspective on where it has been and on where it ought to be heading. This book is a careful reexamination of the internal development of Husserl's thought as well as of the ways in which Heidegger used and transformed the phenomenological method. It begins with an interpretation of the "transcendental" dimension of Husserl's philosophy, stressing the importance of the ontological rather than the epistemological problematic in determining the unfolding of Husserlian thought. The work progresses to an account of Heidegger's early works, viewed as a radicalization of Husserl's phenomenology both in name and substance. Stapleton concludes by contrasting a transcendental origin with a hermeneutic beginning point in terms of their respective ideals of intelligibility, meaning, and being; and then looks at some of the consequences of the idea of a hermeneutic philosophy.

Von Hermann's Hermeneutics and Reflection, translated here from the original German, represents the most fundamental and critical reflection in any language of the concept of phenomenology as it was used by Heidegger and by Husserl.

Phenomenology is one of the most pervasive and influential schools of thought in twentieth-century European philosophy. This book provides a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the idea of the imagination in Husserl and Heidegger. The author also locates phenomenology within the broader context of a philosophical world dominated by Kantian thought, arguing that the location of Husserl within the Kantian landscape is essential to an adequate understanding of phenomenology both as an historical event and as a legacy for present and future philosophy.

Demonstrates how phenomenology constructively addresses problems in philosophy of mind, moral psychology and philosophy of action.

In this work Crowell proposes that the distinguishing feature of 20th-century philosophy is not so much its emphasis on language as its concern with meaning. He argues that transcendental phenomenology is indispensible to the philosophical explanation of the space of meaning.

The guiding dictum of phenomenology is "to the things themselves. " This saying conveys a sense that the "things," the "phenomena" with which we are confronted and into which we seek some insight are not as immediately accessible as may be imagined. Phenomena, however, are often hidden not by their distance from us, but by their very proximity, by the fact that they are taken for granted as being self-evident and understood by all. Even the most common, everyday phenomena and the words used to describe them often reveal, upon closer inspection, a degree of complexity which had previously been unsuspected. Upon interrogation, that which had been taken to be self-evident and widely understood shows itself otherwise; assumed self-evidence frequently masks unintelligibility and common understanding can be a sign of a lack of understanding. One phenomenon which is extremely proximate in our times is the phenomenon of "crisis. " To be sure, one can hardly avoid the word these it abound in periodicals and newspapers, but also, in days. Not only does the learned journals of medicine, political science, economics, art, and law, barely does an edition appear without the discussion of a crisis of one sort or another within these respective fields. One is tempted to remark, along with Umberto Eco, that "crisis sells well. "l One is also inclined to be suspicious of the collective malaise of academics.

It is a study of the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. Through a critical discussion including practically all previously published English and German literature on the subject, the aim is to present a thorough and evenhanded account of the relation between the two. The book provides a detailed presentation of their respective projects and methods, and examines several of their key phenomenological analyses, centering on the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. It offers new perspectives on Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, e.g. concerning the importance of Husserl's phenomenology of the body, the relationship between the Husserlian concept of "constitution" and Heidegger's notion of "transcendence", as well as in its argument that "being" designates the central phenomenon for both phenomenologists. Though the study sacrifices nothing in terms of argumentative rigor or interpretative detail, it is written in such a way as to be accessible and rewarding to non-specialists and specialists alike.