Throughout the past 70 years, the alliance between the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has persisted in a dynamic security environment in which South Korea emerged as a middle-power with robust crisis management capabilities. Conversely, the 1995 famine in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) showcased the DPRK's inability to provide basic services; it was the first time the regime solicited international humanitarian assistance, thus allowing international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to operate in the country. Social network analysis helps illuminate how the pedantic political relationship between the two Koreas caused fluctuations within the humanitarian assistance networks to the DPRK. Due to the ROK's humanitarian assistance capabilities and the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the United States is less likely to conduct unilateral humanitarian assistance operations. Although many capable nongovernmental organizations exist on the Korean Peninsula, the ever-changing geopolitical situation between the United States, ROK, and DPRK can restrict their ability to execute humanitarian operations there.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. Background * A. Research Question * 1. Deterrence and Strategic Options * 2. U.S. Department of Defense and the Republic of Korea * 3. Nongovernmental Organizations * B. Methodology * C. Chapter Outline * II. Evolution of HADR on the Korean Peninsula * A. Economic Development on the Korean Peninsula and HADR * B. Development and Repression of the Independent Society * C. NGOS and the ROK Government * III. Humanitarian Operations in North Korea 1995-2017 * A. Humanitarian Operations in North Korea 1995-2008 * B. Humanitarian Operations in North Korea 2009-2017 * C. Chapter Conclusion * IV. Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response Network to North Korea * A. Network Boundaries * 1. Network Ties (Relations) * 2. NGO Characteristics (Attributes) * 3. Parsing Network Data by Organizational Capabilities * 4. Network Metrics * 5. Topography * 6. Centrality * B. Temporal Analysis of the NGO/IO Network * C. Chapter Conclusion * V. Conclusions and Recommendations * A. Conclusions * B. Recommendations for U.S. Forces In HADR on the Korean PeninsulaWhen Kim Jong-un took power in the DPRK in 2012, the increase in aggressive actions toward regional allies of the United States, and the deteriorating humanitarian conditions for the North Korean average citizen led to an increase in international pressure to mitigate the menace the country presented to its own citizens and neighboring countries. International pressure on the Kim Regime remains central to these efforts. Acts of aggression, such as testing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017, have resulted in the toughening of international sanctions. However, attempts to limit the regime's ability to proliferate nuclear weapons through sanctions have also hindered its ability to provide basic services, such as food and medical care to the DPRK's 25 million citizens. That being said, sanctions are only partly responsible for the deteriorating conditions within the country. The strategic choice by the DPRK to focus on weapons development in lieu of medicine and food is also responsible for the poor humanitarian conditions in the country.

Includes statistics.

Smith describes the famine that devastated the country in the 1990s and the international rescue program that Pyongyang requested and received. Together, the famine and the humanitarian response have wrought subtle but profound changes in North Korea's economy, society, and security outlook. Smith argues that the regime has been prodded into accepting some international norms, allowed markets to develop, and has included some human security concerns alongside military-political interests in its negotiations with the West.

Since 1995, the United States has provided over $1 billion in foreign assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea), about 60% of which has taken the form of food aid, and about 40% in the form of energy assistance channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Additionally, the Bush Administration has proposed offering North Korea broad economic development assistance in exchange for Pyongyang verifiably dismantling its nuclear program and cooperating on other security-related issues. Although the President has considerable flexibility to offer some forms of short term development assistance, longer term aid would likely require congressional action. Since the current North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, when North Korea reportedly admitted that it has a secret uranium enrichment nuclear program, the dollar amount of U.S. aid has fallen by an order of magnitude. No U.S. funds have been provided to KEDO since FY2003, and the Bush Administration's position is that it would like to permanently end the KEDO program. U.S. food aid also has fallen considerably in recent years. This report describes and assesses U.S. aid programs to North Korea, including the controversies surrounding the programs, their relationship to the larger debate over strategy and objectives toward the DPRK, and policy options. The roles of China, South Korea, and Japan in providing assistance to North Korea are discussed, highlighting the likelihood that any dramatic decrease in U.S. aid to North Korea may have only marginal effects without the cooperation of these countries, particularly China and South Korea. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

This report summarizes U.S. assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea). It will be updated periodically to track changes in U.S. provision of aid to North Korea. A more extended description and analysis of aid to North Korea, including assistance provided by other countries, is provided in CRS Report RL31785, Foreign Assistance to North Korea. Since 1995, the United States has provided North Korea with over $1.1 billion in assistance, about 60% of which has paid for food aid. About 40% was energy assistance channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the multilateral organization established in 1994 to provide energy aid in exchange for North Korea's pledge to halt its existing nuclear program. U.S. assistance to North Korea has fallen significantly over the past three years, and was zero in FY2006. The KEDO program was shut down in January 2006. Food aid has been scrutinized because the DPRK government restricts the ability of donor agencies to operate in the country. Compounding the problem is that South Korea and China, by far North Korea's two most important providers of food aid, have little to no monitoring systems in place. Since North Korea tested several missiles in July 2006, South Korea has suspended most official humanitarian assistance. In the summer of 2005, the North Korean government announced it would no longer need humanitarian assistance from the United Nations, including from the World Food Program (WFP), the primary channel for U.S. food aid. Part of Pyongyang's motivation appears to have been a desire to negotiate a less intrusive monitoring presence. In response, the WFP negotiated a drastically scaled-down development assistance program with the North Korean government. Since then, the United States has not provided any food aid.

The Korean Peninsula was and is in a state of flux.More than 60 years after the war that left the country divided, the policies and unpredictability of the North Korean regime, in conjunction with the U.S. alliance with South Korea and the involvement of China in the area, leave the situation there one of the most capricious on the globe. Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula presents the opinions from experts on the subject matter from the policy, military, and academic communities. Drawn from talks at a conference in September 2010 at Marine Corps University, the papers explore the enduring security challenges, the state of existing political and military relationships, the economic implications of unification, and the human rights concerns within North and South Korea. They also reiterate the importance for the broader East Asia region of peaceful resolution of the Korean issues.