This book examines human capital investment, employment and bargaining at the level of the firm. It attempts the first summary of results that incorporates both human capital investment and employment decisions within firm - union bargaining models, emphasising investment in teams, or groups, of workers. The authors also examine human capital in relation to labour demand as well as the delineation between neoclassical and coalitional firms. Further, they investigate connections between, on the one hand, turnover costs and firm-specific human capital and, on the other, unemployment. Labour market policy topics recur throughout the book and include the choice between pure wage and profit sharing remuneration systems, the issue of whether training should be subsidised by governments, worksharing versus layoff decisions, payroll tax incidence and the choice of compensation system as well as the role of human capital in influencing a firm's voluntary ex ante decision as to whether or not to bargain with an established union.

Why has an economy that has done so many things right failed to grow fast? Under-Rewarded Efforts traces Mexico’s disappointing growth to flawed microeconomic policies that have suppressed productivity growth and nullified the expected benefits of the country’s reform efforts. Fast growth will not occur doing more of the same or focusing on issues that may be key bottlenecks to productivity growth elsewhere, but not in Mexico. It will only result from inclusive institutions that effectively protect workers against risks, redistribute towards those in need, and simultaneously align entrepreneurs’ and workers’ incentives to raise productivity.

Despite various reform efforts, Mexico has experienced economic stability but little growth. Today more than half of all Mexican workers are employed informally, and one out of every four is poor. Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes argues that incoherent social programs significantly contribute to this state of affairs and it suggests reforms to improve the situation. Over the past decade, Mexico has channeled an increasing number of resources into subsidizing the creation of low-productivity, informal jobs. These social programs have hampered growth, fostered illegality, and provided erratic protection to workers, trapping many in poverty. Informality has boxed Mexico into a dilemma: provide benefits to informal workers at the expense of lower growth and reduced productivity or leave millions of workers without benefits. Former finance official Santiago Levy proposes how to convert the existing system of social security for formal workers into universal social entitlements. He advocates eliminating wage-based social security contributions and raising consumption taxes on higher-income households to simultaneously increase the rate of growth of GDP, reduce inequality, and improve benefits for workers. Go od Intentions, Bad Outcomes considers whether Mexico can build on the success of Progresa-Oportunidades, a targeted poverty alleviation program that originated in Mexico and has been replicated in over 25 countries as well as in New York City. It sets forth a plan to reform social and economic policy, an essential element of a more equitable and sustainable development strategy for Mexico.

This is one of the first compilations on collective bargaining in higher education reflecting the work of scholars, practitioners, and employer and union advocates. It offers a practical and comprehensive resource to higher education leaders responsible for developing, managing, and maintaining collective bargaining relationships with academic personnel. Offering views from an experienced and diverse group, this book explores how to manage relationships in collaborative, transparent, and equitable ways, best practices for meaningful outcome measures, and approaches for framing collective bargaining as a long-term process that benefits the institution. This volume provides an overview of the contemporary landscape, benchmark measures of success, and practical advice focusing on advancing collaborative, equitable, and sustainable labor relations approaches in higher education. Designed for administrators, union leaders, elected officials, and policy makers, at all stages of their careers as well as for faculty and students in graduate programs, this volume serves as an invaluable resource for those who endeavor to conceptualize, conduct, manage, and implement collective bargaining in more mutually effective and beneficial ways for all parties.

Major changes within and between organizations are now generally negotiated by the parties that have a stake in the consequences of the changes. This was not always so. In 1965, with A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, Richard Walton and Robert McKersie laid the analytical foundation for much of the innovation in the practice of negotiation that has occurred over the last thirty-nine years. Since that time, however, the field has undergone significant changes, and Walton and McKersie's ideas have been applied to a wide variety of situations beyond labor negotiations. Negotiations and Change represents the next generation of thinking. Experts on negotiations, management, and organizational behavior take stock of what has been learned since 1965. They extend and apply the concepts of Walton and McKersie and of other leaders in the study of negotiations to a broad range of business, professional, and personal concerns: workplace teams, conflict management systems, corporate governance, and environmental disputes. While building on those foundations, the essays demonstrate the continued robustness and relevance of Walton and McKersie's behavioral theory by suggesting ways it could be used to improve the management of change. Returning to its roots, the volume concludes with a retrospective by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie.

We study a longitudinal sample of over one million French workers and over 500,000 employing firms. Real total annual compensation per worker is decomposed into components related to observable characteristics, worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity and residual variation. Except for the residual, all components may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. At the level of the individual, we find that person-effects, especially those not related to observables like education, are the most important source of wage variation in France. Firm-effects, while important, are not as important as person-effects. At the level of firms, we find that enterprises that hire high-wage workers are more productive but not more profitable. They are also more capital and high-skilled employee intensive. Enterprises that pay higher wages, controlling for person-effects, are more productive and more profitable. They are also more capital intensive but are not more high-skilled labor intensive. We also find that person-effects explain 92% of inter-industry wage differentials.