Witnesses include: Rep. Bill Barrett, Larry Combest, Earl F. Hilliard, Debbie Stabenow, Charles W. Stenholm, and George E. Nethercutt, Jr.; Daniel G. Amstutz, pres. and ceo, North American Grain Export Grain Assoc., Inc.; Harry Cleberg, pres. and ceo, Farmland Industries, Inc.; Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary, Economics, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State; Dan Glickman, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture; David Hillman , v.p., Arkansas Farm Bureau Federation; Roger Pine, Nat. Corn Growers Assoc.; Wes Sims, Nat. Farmers Union; Loy Sneary, U.S. Rice Producers and U.S.A. Rice Federation; and Mike Yost, pres., American Soybean Assoc.

NSIAD-92-106 Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy

A number of distinguished experts examines the cost U.S. foreign policy controls have imposed on individual liberty and economic opportunity.

The end of the Cold War has changed the shape of organized violence in the world and the ways in which governments and others try to set its limits. Even the concept of international conflict is broadening to include ethnic conflicts and other kinds of violence within national borders that may affect international peace and security. What is not yet clear is whether or how these changes alter the way actors on the world scene should deal with conflict: Do the old methods still work? Are there new tools that could work better? How do old and new methods relate to each other? International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War critically examines evidence on the effectiveness of a dozen approaches to managing or resolving conflict in the world to develop insights for conflict resolution practitioners. It considers recent applications of familiar conflict management strategies, such as the use of threats of force, economic sanctions, and negotiation. It presents the first systematic assessments of the usefulness of some less familiar approaches to conflict resolution, including truth commissions, "engineered" electoral systems, autonomy arrangements, and regional organizations. It also opens up analysis of emerging issues, such as the dilemmas facing humanitarian organizations in complex emergencies. This book offers numerous practical insights and raises key questions for research on conflict resolution in a transforming world system.

Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.--Publisher description.