We document that past highly inflationary episodes are often characterized by a steeper inflationslack relationship. We show that model-generated data from a standard small Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model can replicate this empirical finding when estimated with different expectation formation processes. When inflation becomes de-anchored and expectations drift, we can observe high inflation even with a mildly positive output gap in response to cost-push shocks. The results imply that we should not use an unconditioned (not controlling for expectations change) Phillips curve estimated in normal times to predict the cost of reining in inflation. Our optimal policy exercises prescribe early monetary policy tightening and then easing in the context of positive output gaps and inflation far above the central bank target.

We study the global inflation surge during the pandemic recovery and the implications for aggregate and sectoral Phillips curves. We provide evidence that Phillips curves shifted up and steepened across advanced economies, and that differences in the inflation response across sectors imply the relative price of goods has been pro-cyclical this time around rather than a-cyclical as during previous cycles. We show analytically that these three features emerge endogenously in a two-sector new-Keynesian model when we introduce unbalanced recoveries that run against a supply constraint in the goods sector. A calibrated exercise shows that the resulting changes to the output-inflation relation are quantitatively important and improve the model's ability to replicate the inflation surge during this period.

Global economic activity is experiencing a broad-based and sharper-than-expected slowdown, with inflation higher than seen in several decades. The cost-of-living crisis, tightening financial conditions in most regions, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the lingering COVID-19 pandemic all weigh heavily on the outlook. Global growth is forecast to slow from 6.0 percent in 2021 to 3.2 percent in 2022 and 2.7 percent in 2023. This is the weakest growth profile since 2001 except for the global financial crisis and the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. Global inflation is forecast to rise from 4.7 percent in 2021 to 8.8 percent in 2022 but to decline to 6.5 percent in 2023 and to 4.1 percent by 2024. Monetary policy should stay the course to restore price stability, and fiscal policy should aim to alleviate the cost-of-living pressures while maintaining a sufficiently tight stance aligned with monetary policy. Structural reforms can further support the fight against inflation by improving productivity and easing supply constraints, while multilateral cooperation is necessary for fast-tracking the green energy transition and preventing fragmentation.

Following a remarkable recovery from the pandemic anchored in strong fundamentals, the outlook is for growth to slow broadly in line with potential, as inflation falls within the targeted range by end-2024. However, the risk balance is tilted to the downside, reflecting, among other things, external risks and the continued uncertainty around the proposed judicial reform.

Inflation is regarded by the many as a menace that damages business and can only make life worse for households. Keeping it low depends critically on ensuring that firms and workers expect it to be low. So expectations of inflation are a key influence on national economic welfare. This collection pulls together a galaxy of world experts (including Roy Batchelor, Richard Curtin and Staffan Linden) on inflation expectations to debate different aspects of the issues involved. The main focus of the volume is on likely inflation developments. A number of factors have led practitioners and academic observers of monetary policy to place increasing emphasis recently on inflation expectations. One is the spread of inflation targeting, invented in New Zealand over 15 years ago, but now encompassing many important economies including Brazil, Canada, Israel and Great Britain. Even more significantly, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the United States Federal Bank are the leading members of another group of monetary institutions all considering or implementing moves in the same direction. A second is the large reduction in actual inflation that has been observed in most countries over the past decade or so. These considerations underscore the critical – and largely underrecognized - importance of inflation expectations. They emphasize the importance of the issues, and the great need for a volume that offers a clear, systematic treatment of them. This book, under the steely editorship of Peter Sinclair, should prove very important for policy makers and monetary economists alike.

Czech Republic: Selected Issues

The form of bounded rationality characterizing the representative agent is key in the choice of the optimal monetary policy regime. While inflation targeting prevails for myopia that distorts agents' inflation expectations, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under myopia regarding the output gap, revenue, or interest rate. To the extent that bygones are not bygones under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations is a minimal condition for optimality in a behavioral world. Instrument rules implementation of this optimal policy is shown to be infeasible, questioning the ability of simple rules à la Taylor (1993) to assist the conduct of monetary policy. Bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with welfare losses.