Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, the Bush administration has come under fire for its methods of combating terrorism. Waging war against al Qaeda has proven to be a legal quagmire, with critics claiming that the administration's response in Afghanistan and Iraq is unconstitutional. The war on terror—and, in a larger sense, the administration's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto accords—has many wondering whether the constitutional framework for making foreign affairs decisions has been discarded by the present administration. John Yoo, formerly a lawyer in the Department of Justice, here makes the case for a completely new approach to understanding what the Constitution says about foreign affairs, particularly the powers of war and peace. Looking to American history, Yoo points out that from Truman and Korea to Clinton's intervention in Kosovo, American presidents have had to act decisively on the world stage without a declaration of war. They are able to do so, Yoo argues, because the Constitution grants the president, Congress, and the courts very different powers, requiring them to negotiate the country's foreign policy. Yoo roots his controversial analysis in a brilliant reconstruction of the original understanding of the foreign affairs power and supplements it with arguments based on constitutional text, structure, and history. Accessibly blending historical arguments with current policy debates, The Powers of War and Peace will no doubt be hotly debated. And while the questions it addresses are as old and fundamental as the Constitution itself, America's response to the September 11 attacks has renewed them with even greater force and urgency. “Can the president of the United States do whatever he likes in wartime without oversight from Congress or the courts? This year, the issue came to a head as the Bush administration struggled to maintain its aggressive approach to the detention and interrogation of suspected enemy combatants in the war on terrorism. But this was also the year that the administration’s claims about presidential supremacy received their most sustained intellectual defense [in] The Powers of War and Peace.”—Jeffrey Rosen, New York Times “Yoo’s theory promotes frank discussion of the national interest and makes it harder for politicians to parade policy conflicts as constitutional crises. Most important, Yoo’s approach offers a way to renew our political system’s democratic vigor.”—David B. Rivkin Jr. and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, National Review

The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions ("AP I") is central to the modern law of war, widely referred to as international humanitarian law outside the United States. It updates the Geneva Conventions for protection of war victims and combines them with new or updated rules governing hostilities and the use of weapons found in the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War. Due to its comprehensive nature and adoption by a majority of States, AP I is frequently cited as the source for law of war rules by attorneys and others interested in protecting humanitarian interests. The challenge for United States attorneys, however, is that their country is not a party to AP I and has been a persistent objector to many of its new rules.While the United States signed the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, it determined, after 10 years of analysis, that it would not ratify the protocol. President Reagan called AP I "fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed."1 Yet, as will be detailed throughout this guide, United States officials have declared that aspects of AP I are customary international law. Forty years after signing AP I, and 30 years after rejecting it, the United States has never presented a comprehensive, systematic, official position on the protocol. Officials from the United States Departments of Defense and State have taken positions on particular portions of it. This guide attempts to bring those sources together in one location.

This book comprises contributions by leading experts in the field of international humanitarian law on the subject of the categorisation or classification of armed conflict. It is divided into two sections: the first aims to provide the reader with a sound understanding of the legal questions surrounding the classification of hostilities and its consequences; the second includes ten case studies that examine practice in respect of classification. Understanding how classification operates in theory and practice is a precursor to identifying the relevant rules that govern parties to hostilities. With changing forms of armed conflict which may involve multi-national operations, transnational armed groups and organized criminal gangs, the need for clarity of the law is all-important. The case studies selected for analysis are Northern Ireland, DRC, Colombia, Afghanistan (from 2001), Gaza, South Ossetia, Iraq (from 2003), Lebanon (2006), the so-called war against Al-Qaeda, and future trends. The studies explore the legal consequences of classification particularly in respect of the use of force, detention in armed conflict, and the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law. The practice identified in the case studies allows the final chapter to draw conclusions as to the state of the law on classification.

The third edition of this work sets out a comprehensive and analytical manual of international humanitarian law, accompanied by case analysis and extensive explanatory commentary by a team of distinguished and internationally renowned experts.

While some have argued that neutrality has become irrelevant, this volume asserts that neutrality continues to be a key concept of the law of armed conflict. Neutrality in Contemporary International Law details the rights and duties of neutral states and demonstrates how the rules of neutrality continue to apply in modern day conflicts.