The involuntary soldiers of an unmilitary people such were the forces that American military planners had to pit against hardened Axis veterans, yet prewar unpreparedness dictated that whole divisions of such men would go to war under the supervision of tiny professional cadres. Much to his surprise and delight, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall found that the 88th Infantry Division, his first draftee division, "fought like wildcats" and readily outclassed its German adversaries while measuring up to the best Regular Army divisions. Draftee Division is at once a history of the 88th Division, an analysis of American unit mobilization during World War II, and an insight into the savage Italian Campaign. After an introduction placing the division in historical context, separate chapters address personnel, training, logistics, and overseas deployment. Another chapter focuses upon preliminary adjustments to the realities of combat, after which two chapters trace the 88th's climactic drive through the Gustav Line into Rome itself. A final chapter takes the veteran 88th to final victory. Of particular interest are observations concerning differences connected with mobilization between the 88th and less successful divisions and discussions of the contemporary relevance of the 88th's experiences. Draftee Division is especially rich in its sources. John Sloan Brown, with close ties to the division, has secured extensive and candid contributions from veterans. To these he has added a full array of archival and secondary sources. The result is a definitive study of American cadremen creating a division out of raw draftees and leading them on to creditable victories. Its findings will be important for military and social historians and for students of defense policy

The 88th Division played a major role in the battle of Italy, where it was rated by the Germans after the summer of 1944 as the best American division in Italy. Because of the outstanding job it did in Italy, the 88th contributed its share to the winning of the war. It was the first of the draft infantry divisions to enter combat on any front in World War II and it was among the top divisions in the American Army. It won its share of territory and honors during its 344 days of combat. It paid dearly for all that it won—it lost 15,173 officers and men killed, wounded and missing in action. Only thirteen other divisions in the U.S. Army suffered heavier losses. The 88th fought its battles on what was called “a forgotten front.” Some day history will appraise the true worth of the Italian campaign in the overall war picture. Military historians will analyze and sift and publish detailed volumes on the operational contribution of the 88th in the battle for Italy. This book is not a history, in the true sense of the word. It is not intended to be such. It is rather the story of a combat division from its beginning to its end. It is a story compiled both from official journals and from the personal experiences of the citizen-soldiers who made up its squads and platoons. It is a story which never can be told in every complete detail. For every one of the incidents related here, a reader can remember scores that are not found in these pages. There are not enough words, or paper, to list them all. The incidents related are considered to be representative of the experiences of the majority of 88th men.

This paper clearly shows the immediate relevancy of historical study to current events. One of the most common criticisms of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq in 2003 is that too few troops were used. The argument often fails to satisfy anyone for there is no standard against which to judge. A figure of 20 troops per 1000 of the local population is often mentioned as the standard, but as McGrath shows, that figure was arrived at with some questionable assumptions. By analyzing seven military operations from the last 100 years, he arrives at an average number of military forces per 1000 of the population that have been employed in what would generally be considered successful military campaigns. He also points out a variety of important factors affecting those numbers-from geography to local forces employed to supplement soldiers on the battlefield, to the use of contractors-among others.