Seminar paper from the year 2018 in the subject Economics - Macro-economics, general, grade: 1.0, Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH, language: English, abstract: The so-called "helicopter money" is discussed as a direct alternative to monetary policy instruments like QE with which a Central Bank (CB) purchases government securities. This flooding [of] financial institutions with capital lowers interest rates and increases the money supply without printing new money. However, the effects of QE on the real economy were described as indirect and underwhelming.

Walter Bagehot noticed once that “John Bull can stand many things, but he cannot stand two per cent.” Well, for several years, he has had to stand interest rates well below that, in some countries even below zero. However, despite this sacrifice, the economic recovery from the Great Recession has been disappointingly weak. This book’s aim is to answer this question. The central thesis of the book is that the standard understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism is flawed. That understanding adopts erroneous assumptions—such as, that low interest rates always stimulate economic growth by boosting the credit supply, investment, and consumption—and does not fully take into account several unintended channels of monetary policy, such as risk-taking, high level of debt, or zombification of the economy. In other words, the effectiveness of monetary policy is limited during economic downturns accompanied by the debt overhang and the balance sheet recession, and generates negative effects, which can make the policy counterproductive. The author provides a thorough analysis of the issues related to the interest rates in the conduct of monetary policy, such as the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, the portfolio-balance channel and the wealth effect, zombie firms in the economy, the misallocation of resources, as well as the neutral interest rate targeting and the difference between the neutral and natural interest rate and the negative interest rate policy. The book is written in an accessible and engaging manner and will be a valuable resource for scholars of monetary economics as well as readers interested in (unconventional) monetary policy.

Recessions are a recurring phenomenon and there are repeated debates about how to combat them when the crisis hits and after the economy begins to grow again. Laurence Seidman argues that currently we are not ready to combat the next recession. A recession involves a plunge in aggregate demand for goods and services which compels producers to cut production and employment. Fortunately, a large boost in demand can be achieved by a large fiscal stimulus-primarily a temporary large increase in tax rebates for households plus several fiscal supplements. But fiscal stimulus has always involved a large increase in government debt, something Congress understandably resists. The assumption that a large fiscal stimulus requires an increase in government debt is false, Seidman asserts in this thought-provoking book. In fact, it is astonishingly easy to implement even a very large fiscal stimulus without any increase in government debt. All it takes is for Congress to enact a fiscal stimulus and the Federal Reserve to make a transfer (not loan) to the Treasury roughly equal to the fiscal stimulus so the Treasury doesn't have to borrow. Stimulus-without-debt consists of a transfer (not loan) from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury so that the Treasury does not have to borrow to finance fiscal stimulus enacted by Congress. Seidman explains all aspects of this new way to combat recession, "stimulus-without-debt." He presents evidence that fiscal stimulus works in a recession-it increases aggregate demand which stimulates production and employment. He explains why the fiscal stimulus should consist primarily of tax rebates for households plus several fiscal supplements. His analysis covers basic foundations as well as implications for inflation, central banks, and how to address secular stagnation. When the next recession hits, we will be ready to combat it if we know how to use fiscal stimulus without increasing government debt. Seidman shows us how.

Eric Lonergan explores our complex relationship with money. In a provocative and insightful analysis, he argues that few things seem to matter more to us, but few things are as poorly understood. Economists have long worked with the theory that our relationship to money is rational, but not all our reactions to it make sense. Lonergan shows that many of our views about money, credit and saving are little better than prejudices. The same social and emotional forces that affect quant traders in the world?s financial markets can be seen in the mania of Pok?n card trading in the school playground.This fascinating book reveals the tension between money?s capacity to assist us in our lives and its propensity to cause instability and to distort our values. We are limited in our ability to control money?s power, says Lonergan, but only by understanding money better, and thinking about it less, may we get on with enjoying what we have.

Incorporating HC 199 i-iii, session 2008-09

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, central banks created trillions of dollars of new money, and poured it into financial markets. ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE) was supposed to prevent deflation and restore economic growth. But the money didn’t go to ordinary people: it went to the rich, who didn’t need it. It went to big corporations and banks – the same banks whose reckless lending caused the crash. This led to a decade of stagnation, not recovery. QE failed. In this book, Frances Coppola makes the case for a ‘people’s QE’, in which the money goes directly to ordinary people and small businesses. She argues that it is the fairest and most effective way of restoring crisis-hit economies and helping to solve the long-term challenges of ageing populations, automation and climate change.

No issue is more fundamental in contemporary macroeconomics than the causes of the recent Great Recession. The standard view is that the banks were to blame because they took on too much risk, ‘went bust’ and had to be bailed out by governments. But very few banks actually had losses in excess of their capital. The counter-argument presented in this stimulating new book is that the Great Recession was in fact caused by a collapse in the rate of change of the quantity of money. The book’s argument echoes that on the causes of the Great Depression made by Friedman and Schwartz in their classic book A Monetary History of the United States.