Patrick Mercer, the MP for Newark, was approached by a journalist purporting to be a public affairs consultant representing a group called 'Friends of Fiji', who wished to campaign for the readmission of Fiji into the Commonwealth, and sought to do so by hiring people to use influence on its behalf. Between the initial approach from the 'consultant' on 6 March and the last meeting between them on 25 April, Mr Mercer tabled five Parliamentary questions and an Early Day Motion (EDM), and actively sought to set up an All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Fiji. On 31 May 2013 articles appeared in the Daily Telegraph about the case, and a Panorama programme was broadcast on 6 June 2013. As a result, Mr Mercer referred himself to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. The Commissioner found that Mr Mercer had: failed to register monies received for the provision of consultancy services; failed to deposit an agreement for the provision of services; failed to declare a relevant interest when tabling five parliamentary questions, when tabling an early-day motion, when making approaches to other Members, and, most probably, at a meeting of a prospective All-Party Parliamentary Group; and tabled parliamentary questions and an early-day motion, and taken steps to establish an All-Party Parliamentary Group, at the request of paying clients. The Committee recommend that Mr Mercer be suspended from the House for a period of six calendar months. [Note: Mr Mercer resigned on 29 April 2014, before publication of this report.]

Select committees are generally faced by those at the very top of their game: high-flying CEOs, powerful executives and industry experts. Why, then, do the very words send shivers down the spines of even our most senior representatives? Perhaps it is the unblinking eye of the television cameras, the hawkish interrogation of the committee chair or simply the knowledge of those Goliaths who have fallen before. After twenty years of advising big-name clients on how to take on this gruelling ordeal, Scott Colvin argues that it needn't be this way. Based on interviews with those on the front line, he offers a fresh perspective on how the process could be improved for committee members and witnesses alike. Steeped in exclusive inside knowledge and expert tips, and with a step-by-step manual on how to prepare for a hearing, this is the essential guide to not only surviving but thriving in the hot seat.

This collection of essays by leading academics, lawyers, parliamentarians and parliamentary officials provides a critical assessment of the UK Parliament's two main constitutional roles-as a legislature and as the preeminent institution for calling government to account. Both functions are undergoing change and facing new challenges. Part 1 (Legislation) includes chapters on Parliament's emerging responsibilities for pre-legislative scrutiny of government Bills and for evaluating proposed legislation against explicit constitutional standards. The impact on legislation of the European Union and the growing influence of the House of Lords are also examined. Part 2 (Accountability) investigates how Parliament operates to scrutinise areas of executive action previously often shielded from effective parliamentary oversight, including national security, war-making powers and administrative justice. There are also chapters on parliamentary reform, including analysis of the House of Commons 'Wright reforms', parliamentary sovereignty, privilege and the European Convention on Human Rights, Euroscepticism, and parliamentary sovereignty and the regulation of lobbyists. The book will be of interest to anyone who is curious about the work of Parliament and is aimed at legal academics, practitioners and political scientists.

This is an analysis of the revolution of the last two decades that has built an extensive new regulatory apparatus governing British public ethics. The book sets the new machinery in the wider institutional framework of British government. Its main purpose is to understand the dilemmas of regulatory design that have emerged in each area examined.

Should the criminal law be used to deter and punish corruption in politics: from employing family members at public expense to improper spending on elections, lobbying, and cronyism? How did so many MPs avoid facing charges after the 2009 government expenses scandal? In this book, Jeremy Horder tackles these questions and more. As well as offering the first treatment of the history, philosophy, and politics of the application of the offence of misconduct in office to Members of Parliament in England and Wales, Horder explains how political corruption might be dealt with in future, and how politicians could be held accountable for their actions so that they are deterred from betraying the public's trust. Use of the criminal law should not be the sole or even the main way to remedy all corruption in politics. Nevertheless, for too long the offence of misconduct in a public office has had an ambiguous status in the political realm. If we are to preserve the good health of government it must be seen as a constitutional fundamental. A charge of misconduct provides a way in which corrupt conduct on the part of legislators can be punished with an appropriate label, holding them to account for the misuse of power by reference to the standards of ordinary people. When other - civil law or regulatory - means prove insufficient, it should be possible for ordinary members of a jury, and not for Parliamentarians or other officials, to decide whether, for example, the expenditure of public money on legislators' private income and benefits amounts to a criminal abuse of the public's trust. This book offers an authoritative and accessible account of a 'bottom-up' (jury standards-led), as opposed to a 'top-down' (officials applying their own standards), approach to the role of the criminal law in constitutional contexts.