Review: "Harold Wilson's Cold War analyses the Labour government's efforts to promote East-West detente and to improve Anglo-Soviet relations from 1964 to 1970." "Geraint Hughes challenges the caricature of Harold Wilson's rigid subservience to America, and shows how, as Prime Minister, he proposed to develop closer contacts with the Soviet leadership, and to foster co-operation on arms control, conflict resolution in Vietnam, and East-West trade."--Jacket.

Explores how the European policies of the British Labour Party and Danish Social Democrats evolved between 1958 and enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, comparing how they each responded to the integration process at key moments and, more innovatively, highlights the impact of informal contacts between them.

An account of treachery in British and American intelligence agencies.

To provide a better understanding of Anglo-American relations at a pivotal moment, this volume provides all the correspondence between Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson from the time Wilson became Prime Minister (October 1964) until Johnson stepped down as President (January 1969). Whilst the United States was a superpower on the rise and Britain a declining influence on the world stage, the letters reveal that Johnson was eager for international allies and that Wilson possessed an independence which belies his image as a puppet of the President.

In 1950 the British government accorded diplomatic recognition to the newly founded People's Republic of China. But it took 22 years for Britain to establish full diplomatic relations with China. How far was Britain's China policy a failure until 1972? This book argues that Britain and China were involved in the 'everyday Cold War', or a continuous process of contestation and cooperation that allowed them to 'normalize' their confrontation in the absence of full diplomatic relations. From Vietnam and Taiwan to the mainland and Hong Kong, China's 'everyday Cold War' against Britain was marked by diplomatic ritual, propaganda rhetoric and symbolic gestures. Rather than pursuing a failed policy of 'appeasement', British decision-makers and diplomats regarded engagement or negotiation with China as the best way of fighting the 'everyday Cold War'. Based on extensive British and Chinese archival sources, this book examines not only the high politics of Anglo-Chinese relations, but also how the British diplomats experienced the Cold War at the local level.

This book, based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a 'Pound-Defence' deal with the USA. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labour Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.