This influential book makes sense of abstract debates about the nature of law and the rule of law by situating them in the real-world context of apartheid-era South Africa. The new edition examines the transformation in South Africa since the end of apartheid, and the shift in debates surrounding the rule of law post 9/11.

In this book Dimitrios Kyritsis advances an original account of constitutional review of primary legislation for its compatibility with human rights. Key to it is the value of separation of powers. When the relationship between courts and the legislature realizes this value, it makes a stronger claim to moral legitimacy. Kyritsis steers a path between the two extremes of the sceptics and the enthusiasts. Against sceptics who claim that constitutional review is an affront to democracy he argues that it is a morally legitimate institutional option for democratic societies because it can provide an effective check on the legislature. Although the latter represents the people and should thus be given the initiative in designing government policy, it carries serious risks, which institutional design must seek to avert. Against enthusiasts he maintains that fundamental rights protection is not the exclusive province of courts but the responsibility of both the judiciary and the legislature. Although courts may sometimes be given the power to scrutinize legislation and even strike it down, if it violates human rights, they must also respect the legislature's important contribution to their joint project. Occasionally, they may even have a duty to defer to morally sub-optimal decisions, as far as rights protection is concerned. This is as it should be. Legitimacy demands less than the ideal. In turn, citizens ought to accept discounts on perfect justice for the sake of achieving a reasonably just and effective political order overall.

Conventionally, international legal scholarship concerned with norm conflicts focuses on identifying how international law can or should resolve them. This book adopts a different approach. It focuses on identifying those norm conflicts that law cannot and should not resolve. The book offers an unprecedented, controversial, yet sophisticated, argument in favour of construing such irresolvable conflicts as legal dilemmas. Legal dilemmas exist when a legal actor confronts a conflict between at least two legal norms that cannot be avoided or resolved. Addressing both academics and practitioners, the book aims to identify the character and consequences of legal dilemmas, to distil their legal function within the sphere of international law, and to encourage serious theoretical and practical investigation into the conditions that lead to a legal dilemma. The first part proposes a definition of legal dilemmas and distinguishes the term from numerous related concepts. Based on this definition, the second part scrutinises international law's contemporary norm conflict resolution and accommodation devices in order to identify their limited ability to resolve certain kinds of norm conflicts. Against the background of the limits identified in the second part, the third part outlines and evaluates the book's proposed method of dealing with legal dilemmas. In contrast to conventional approaches that recommend dealing with irresolvable norm conflicts by means of non liquet declarations, judicial law-making, or a balancing test, the book's proposal envisions that irresolvable norm conflicts are dealt with by judicial and sovereign actors in a complementary fashion. Judicial actors should openly acknowledge irresolvable conflicts and sovereign actors should decide with which norm they will comply. The book concludes with the argument that analysing various aspects of international law through the concept of a legal dilemma enhances its conceptual accuracy, facilitates more legitimate decision-making, and maintains its dynamic responsiveness.

Judges sometimes hear cases in which the law, as they honestly understand it, requires results that they consider morally objectionable. Most people assume that, nevertheless, judges have an ethical obligation to apply the law correctly, at least in reasonably just legal systems. This is the view of most lawyers, legal scholars, and private citizens, but the arguments for it have received surprisingly little attention from philosophers. Combiming ethical theory with discussions of caselaw, Jeffrey Brand-Ballard challenges arguments for the traditional view, including arguments from the fact that judges swear oaths to uphold the law, and arguments from our duty to obey the law, among others. He then develops an alternative argument based on ways in which the rule of law promotes the good. Patterns of excessive judicial lawlessness, even when morally motivated, can damage the rule of law. Brand-Ballard explores the conditions under which individual judges are morally responsible for participating in destructive patterns of lawless judging. These arguments build upon recent theories of collective intentionality and presuppose an agent-neutral framework, rather than the agent-relative framework favored by many moral philosophers. Defying the conventional wisdom, Brand-Ballard argues that judges are not always morally obligated to apply the law correctly. Although they have an obligation not to participate in patterns of excessive judicial lawlessness, an individual departure from the law so as to avoid an unjust result is rarely a moral mistake if the rule of law is otherwise healthy. Limits of Legality will interest philosophers, legal scholars, lawyers, and anyone concerned with the ethics of judging.

Comparative constitutionalism emerged in its current form against the backdrop of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. As that backdrop recedes into the past, it is being replaced by a more multi-polar and confusing world, and the current state of the discipline of comparative constitutionalism reflects this fragmentation and uncertainty. This has opened up space for new, more varied, and increasingly critical voices seeking to improve the project of democratic constitutionalism. But it also raises questions: What of the past, if anything, is worth preserving? Which more recent parts should be defining of the field? In this context, this book asks which are - or should be - the canonical texts of comparative constitutionalism. The theoretical scope of the contributions is broad and ambitious, selecting primary material from beyond the existing textbooks to engage the concept of a canon. This framework provides significant insights about inclusion and exclusion, and proposes candidates for canonical and anti-canonical materials. The result is a wide-ranging discussion, among many voices, of how particular judgments and other primary texts have shaped or should shape our understanding of central elements of democratic constitutionalism from a comparative law perspective. This book is not a prescription of one universal understanding, but a broader conversation about the field and the future of constitutional democracy.

Lawfare is a complex and evolving concept with many permutations. It is a term that is used to describe both a judicialisation of politics where the Constitutional Court is called upon to uphold constitutional responsibilities, compensating for institutional failures in the broader democratic space, and instances where there is abuse of the legal process to escape accountability. When the court is dragged into politics, it forces an examination of the legitimate scope of judicial review. This book explains how judicialisation of politics leads to the politicisation of adjudication and further weaponisation of the law. Exploring the judicial-political dynamics of South Africa from 2009 onwards, the work traces the consequences of the judicialisation of politics for institutional resilience and broader constitutional stability. Through an in-depth study of judicial legitimacy, the book seeks to provide an overarching theoretical justification for the dangers that inhere in lawfare. It analyses the potential costs of both judicial statesmanship and strategies of deference and avoidance when trying to navigate the Court safely through the era of lawfare. South Africa offers an interesting crucible within which to observe an unfolding global trend. Strengthened by its comparative focus, the implications of lawfare presented in this book transcend the South African context and are applicable to other jurisdictions in the world. The book will be of interest to researchers, academics and practitioners working in the areas of Constitutional Law and Politics.

Entick v Carrington is one of the canons of English public law and in 2015 it is 250 years old. In 1762 the Earl of Halifax, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, despatched Nathan Carrington and three other of the King's messengers to John Entick's house in Stepney. They broke into his house, seizing his papers and causing significant damage. Why? Because he was said to have written seditious papers published in the Monitor. Entick sued Carrington and the other messengers for trespass. The defendants argued that the Earl of Halifax had given them legal authority to act as they had. Lord Camden ruled firmly in Entick's favour, holding that the warrant of a Secretary of State could not render lawful actions such as these which were otherwise unlawful. The case is a canonical statement of the common law's commitment to the constitutional principle of the rule of law. In this collection, leading public lawyers reflect on the history of the case, the enduring importance of the legal principles for which it stands, and the broader implications of Entick v Carrington 250 years on. Winner of the American Society for Legal History Sutherland Prize 2016.