This volume explores the reasons for Hans Kelsen’s lack of influence in the United States and proposes ways in which Kelsen’s approach to law, philosophy, and political, democratic, and international relations theory could be relevant to current debates within the U.S. academy in those areas. Along the way, the volume examines Kelsen’s relationship and often hidden influences on other members of the mid-century Central European émigré community whose work helped shape twentieth-century social science in the United States. The book includes major contributions to the history of ideas and to the sociology of the professions in the U.S. academy in the twentieth century. Each section of the volume explores a different aspect of the puzzle of the neglect of Kelsen’s work in various disciplinary and national settings. Part I provides reconstructions of Kelsen’s legal theory and defends that theory against negative assessments in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Part II focuses both on Kelsen’s theoretical views on international law and his practical involvement in the post-war development of international criminal law. Part III addresses Kelsen’s theories of democracy and justice while placing him in dialogue with other major twentieth-century thinkers, including two fellow émigré scholars, Leo Strauss and Albert Ehrenzweig. Part IV explores Kelsen’s intellectual legacies through European and American perspectives on the interaction of Kelsen’s theoretical approach to law and national legal traditions in the United States and Germany. Each contribution features a particular applications of Kelsen’s approach to doctrinal and interpretive issues currently of interest in the legal academy. The volume concludes with two chapters on the nature of Kelsen’s legal theory as an instance of modernism.

Hans Kelsen is commonly associated with legal theory and philosophy of law. Democracy in Its Essence: Hans Kelsen as a Political Thinker instead investigates Kelsen’s democratic theory as it developed between the 1920s and 1950s, which challenged the existence of democracies in many different respects. Kelsen provided a critical reflection on the strengths and problems of living within a democratic system, while also defending it against a series of specific targets: from the Soviet regime and Bolshevism to European Fascisms, from religious-based conceptions of politics to those claiming a perfect identity between capitalism and classical liberal institutions, and chiefly against all those ideologies claiming to possess objective understanding of what true freedom and true democracy signify. By seeking what he defined as the “essence” and “value” of democracy, Kelsen elaborated a pluralist, relativist, constitutional, proceduralist, and liberal theory of representative democracy, characterized by a strong recall to the values of tolerance, responsibility, and respect toward “the other” as well as to the idea of politics as space for compromise. In this book, Sara Lagi reconstructs his political theory as a relevant contribution to the twentieth-century liberal-democratic tradition of thought, while representing a stimulating reflection on the meaning and implication of democracy both as a political system and as a form of co-existence.

The history of international criminal justice is often recounted as a series of institutional innovations. But international criminal justice is also the product of intellectual developments made in its infancy. This book examines the contributions of a dozen key figures in the early phase of international criminal justice, focusing principally on the inter-war years up to Nuremberg. Where did these figures come from, what did they have in common, and what is left of their legacy? What did they leave out? How was international criminal justice framed by the concerns of their epoch and what intuitions have passed the test of time? What does it mean to reimagine international criminal justice as emanating from individual intellectual narratives? In interrogating this past in all its complexity one does not only do justice to it; one can recover a sense of the manifold trajectories that international criminal justice could have taken.

Hans Kelsen and the Natural Law Tradition provides the first sustained examination of Hans Kelsen’s critical engagement, itself founded upon a distinctive theory of legal positivism, with the Natural Law Tradition. This edited collection commences with a comprehensive introduction which establishes the character of Kelsen’s critical engagement as a general critique of natural law combined with a more specific critique of representative thinkers of the Natural Law Tradition. The subsequent chapters are then devoted to a detailed analysis of Kelsen’s engagement with prominent theorists from the Natural Law Tradition. The volume concludes with an exploration, focusing upon the delineation of a non-positivist legal theory in the debate between Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz, of the continued presence of Kelsenian legal positivism in contemporary legal theory.

This book reflects on how the concept of human dignity, a central and classical concept in public international law, is used to protect the rights of particularly vulnerable sectors of contemporary society.

This book critically examines the conception of legal science and the nature of law developed by Hans Kelsen. It provides a single, dedicated space for a range of established European scholars to engage with the influential work of this Austrian jurist, legal philosopher, and political philosopher. The introduction provides a thematization of the Kelsenian notion of law as a legal science. Divided into six parts, the chapter contributions feature distinct levels of analysis. Overall, the structure of the book provides a sustained reflection upon central aspects of Kelsenian legal science and the nature of law. Parts one and two examine the validity of the project of Kelsenian legal science with particular reference to the social fact thesis, the notion of a science of positive law and the specifically Kelsenian concept of the basic norm (Grundnorm). The next three parts engage in a critical analysis of the relationship of Kelsenian legal science to constitutionalism, practical reason, and human rights. The last part involves an examination of the continued pertinence of Kelsenian legal science as a theory of the nature of law with a particular focus upon contemporary non-positivist theories of law. The conclusion discusses the increasing distance of contemporary theories of legal positivism from a Kelsenian notion of legal science in its consideration of the nature of law.