This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology

This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law, psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners. The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation.

This text looks at game theory and its uses as a tool to enable people to make strategic decisions. The second edition emphasises the practical aspects of game theory. The text is divided into five parts allowing the logical selection of material based on teaching needs.

This is an advanced textbook covering topics in game theory which are of potential use in economics.