Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. In the media or on the street, we might hear that a specific country has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. Do such attributions make conceptual sense or are they mere political rhetoric? And what does that imply for the individual members of these groups? Group Duties offers the first comprehensive answer to these questions. Stephanie Collins defends a Tripartite Model of group duties - so-called because it divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, we have combinations - collections of agents that don't have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. These groups cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties, one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to 'I-reason': to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, there are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. These are coalitions. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members' several duties to 'we-reason': to do one's part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third and finally, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives' duties imply duties for collectives' members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty. With the Tripartite Model in-hand, Collins argues that we can target our political demands at the right entities, in the right way, for the right reasons.

Relations between groups of people are determined both by the attitudes and behaviour patterns of the individuals who constitute these groups, and by their social, economic, political and ideological background. Intergroup relations are therefore open to both psychological and sociological explanations, and the study of intergroup relations represents a way in which these two levels of explanation, which so often fail to take account of each other, may be integrated. This is the thesis advanced here by Willem Doise. Professor Doise discusses psychological explanations of social stereotypes and prejudices by examining specific clinical psychologists and then approaches these phenomena sociologically. He also describes the psychological process of category differentiation and its role in intergroup relations. This book, first published in 1978, will be of particular interest to social psychologists, and to all social scientists interested in the problem of integrating psychological and sociological explanation.

Can parents send their children to private schools and still live up to their ideals? Can you be a good citizen and a good parent? These difficult questions, and many more, are raised and answered in this insightful and thought-provoking book.

The biological and philosophical implications of the emergence of new collective individuals from associations of living beings. Our intuitive assumption that only organisms are the real individuals in the natural world is at odds with developments in cell biology, ecology, genetics, evolutionary biology, and other fields. Although organisms have served for centuries as nature's paradigmatic individuals, science suggests that organisms are only one of the many ways in which the natural world could be organized. When living beings work together—as in ant colonies, beehives, and bacteria-metazoan symbiosis—new collective individuals can emerge. In this book, leading scholars consider the biological and philosophical implications of the emergence of these new collective individuals from associations of living beings. The topics they consider range from metaphysical issues to biological research on natural selection, sociobiology, and symbiosis. The contributors investigate individuality and its relationship to evolution and the specific concept of organism; the tension between group evolution and individual adaptation; and the structure of collective individuals and the extent to which they can be defined by the same concept of individuality. These new perspectives on evolved individuality should trigger important revisions to both philosophical and biological conceptions of the individual. Contributors Frédéric Bouchard, Ellen Clarke, Jennifer Fewell, Andrew Gardner, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Charles J. Goodnight, Matt Haber, Andrew Hamilton, Philippe Huneman, Samir Okasha, Thomas Pradeu, Scott Turner, Minus van Baalen

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: INTEGRATING INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS, THIRD EDITION is a well-organized introduction to the current field of organizational behavior with in-depth coverage of the most critical concepts. Its practical approach shows the power of organizational behavior theory for understanding one's behavior and the behavior of others in any organization. Although firmly grounded in behavioral science theory and research, the text is not a compendium of research findings. Champoux includes examples and builds frameworks that make the material clear and easy to understand. The concise format allows the text to be used as a primer or to be supplemented with additional cases, readings, or exercises. More interactive than in previous editions, this text provides students with several online features to reinforce their knowledge of chapter content with exercises, practice and other learning opportunities.

This volume is an introductory text to the individual and organizational dynamics by an author with extensive experience in the field. It examines the unconscious processes of human behaviour that affect all organizations and institutions. It is aimed at those who are currently employed as managers or consultants, students of management, and others with the opportunity to develop knowledge skills and ability in an area of organizational behaviour, which has been largely inaccessible to the majority.

This volume focuses on social perception, the processing of information about people. This issue has always been central to social psychology, but this book brings together literatures that in large part have been separated by the nature of the social target that is involved. Historically, research on person perception developed quite independently from research involving perceptions of groups. Whereas the former research generally focused on the cognitive processes involved in forming impressions of individuals, research on group perception examined the content of stereotypes and the conditions under which they are used in social judgment. There was been little overlap in the theories and methods of these subfields, and different researchers were central in each. The chapters in this book highlight research and theorizing about social perception, exploring the processes involved in social perception from persons to groups. Some chapters describe work that was originally developed in person perception but is being extended to understanding groups. Other chapters illustrate how some processes studied in the domain of stereotyping also affect perceptions of individual persons. Finally, other chapters focus on variables that affect perceptions and judgments of both individuals and groups, proving opportunities for greater recognition of the common set of factors that are central to all types of social perception. This groundbreaking book highlights the research contributions of David L. Hamilton, whose research has played a central role in uniting these previously independent areas of research. It provides essential reading for upper-level courses on social cognition or social perception and could also serve as an auxiliary text in courses on interpersonal perception/relations and courses on stereotyping/intergroup relations.