This anthology—the second of an initial two volume set—specifically covers Small Wars Journal writings on Al Qaeda and the Islamic State spanning the years 2012-2014. This set is meant to contribute to U.S. security debates focusing on radical Islamist global insurgency by collecting diverse SWJ essays into more easily accessible formats. Small Wars Journal has long been a leader in insurgency and counterinsurgency research and scholarship with an emphasis on practical applications and policy outcomes in furtherance of U.S. global and allied nation strategic interests. The site is able to lay claim to supporting the writings of many COIN (counterinsurgency) practitioners. This includes Dr. David Kilcullen whose early work dating from late 2004 “Countering Global Insurgency” helped to lay much of the conceptual basis focusing on this threat and as a result greatly helped to facilitate the writings that were later incorporated into these Al Qaeda and Islamic State focused anthologies. This volume is composed of sixty-six chapters divided into sections on a) radical Islamist OPFORs (opposition forces) and context and b) U.S.—allied policy and counter radical Islamist strategies. The work also contains a preface by Matt Begert, a foreword by Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng, an introduction, a postscript, an extensive notes section, and editor and contributor biographies on sixty-four individuals as well as an acronyms listing and an initial ‘About SWJ’ and foundation section.

This work is the third Small Wars Journal anthology focusing on radical Sunni Islamic terrorist and insurgent groups. It covers this professional journal’s writings for 2015 and complements the earlier Global Radical Islamist Insurgency anthologies that were produced as Vol. I: 2007–2011 (published in 2015) and Vol. II: 2012–2014 (published in 2016). This anthology, which offers roughly five hundred pages of additional analysis, follows the same general conceptual breakdown as the earlier works, and is divided into two major thematic sections—one focusing on jihadi terrorism, insurgency, and the Islamic State in context and the other focusing on US-allied policy and counter-jihadi and counter–Islamic State strategies.

This work is the fourth Small Wars Journal anthology focusing on radical Sunni Islamic terrorists and insurgent groups. It covers this professional journals writings for 2016 and is a compliment to the earlier Global Radical Islamist Insurgency anthologies that were produced as Vol. I: 20072011 (published in 2015) and Vol. II: 20122014 (published in 2016) and Jihadi Terrorism, Insurgency, and the Islamic State spanning 2015 (published in 2017). This anthology, which offers well over six hundred pages of focused analysis, follows the same general conceptual breakdown as the earlier works and is divided into two major thematic sectionsone focusing on al-Qaeda and Islamic state activities in 2016 and the other focusing on US Allied policies and counterinsurgent strategies.

Part of the Small Wars Journal (SWJ) Anthology, Hammer of the Caliphate is a continuation of previous works on the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and their affiliate groups. The anthology title is a play on words related to the fifteenth-century treatise Malleus Maleficarum (Hammer of the Witches). Given the Islamic State’s predisposition for engaging in heinous acts and barbaric atrocities in the name of their apocalyptic god, one derived from a perverted version of what mainstream Islam is today, declaring IS anathema to our modern world seems only fitting. The work represents the fifth volume in the SWJ series of radical Islamist-focused anthologies.

This book focuses on the crises facing Al Qaeda and how the mass killing of Muslims is challenging its credibility as a leader among Islamist jihadist organizations. The book argues that these crises are directly related to Al Qaeda’s affiliation with the extreme violence employed against Muslims in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the decade since 9/11. Al Qaeda’s public and private responses to this violence differ greatly. While in public Al Qaeda has justified those attacks declaring that, for the establishment of a state of ‘true believers’, they are a necessary evil, in private Al Qaeda has been advising its local affiliates to refrain from killing Muslims. To better understand the crises facing Al Qaeda, the book explores the development of Central Al Qaeda’s complex relationship with radical (mis)appropriations and manifestations of takfir, which allows one Muslim to declare another an unbeliever, and its unique relationship with each of its affiliates in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The author then goes on to consider how the prominence of takfir is contributing to the deteriorating security in those countries and how this is affecting Al Qaeda’s credibility as an Islamist terror organization. The book concludes by considering the long-term viability of Al Qaeda and how its demise could allow the rise of the even more radical, violent Islamic State and the implications this has for the future security of the Middle East, North Africa and Central/South Asia. This book will be of much interest to students of political violence and terrorism, Islamism, global security and IR.

Central Asia is the third largest point of origin for Salafi jihadist foreign fighters in the conflagration in Syria and Iraq, with more than 4,000 total fighters joining the conflict since 2012 and 2,500 reportedly arriving in the 2014-2015 timeframe alone. As the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continues to lose territory under duress from U.S.-led anti-ISIL coalition activities, some predict that many may return home bent on jihad and generating terror and instability across Central Asia. Yet several factors indicate that such an ominous foreign fighter return may not materialize. Among these factors are that a majority of Central Asians fighting for ISIL and the al-Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq are recruited while working abroad in Russia, often from low-wage jobs under poor conditions making the recruits ripe for radicalization. In addition, many of those heading for jihad in Syria and the Levant expect that they are on a "one way journey," some to martyrdom but most for a completely new life, and do not plan a return. Most Central Asian states face their greatest risk of domestic instability and violent extremism as a reaction to political repression and counterterrorism (CT) policies that counterproductively conflate political opposition and the open practice of Islam with a domestic jihadist threat. If improperly calibrated, greater U.S. CT assistance to address foreign fighter returns may strengthen illiberal regime short-term focus on political power consolidation, overplay the limited risks of foreign fighter returns, and increase the risks of domestic unrest and future instability. The United States has few means to pressure Central Asian regimes into policies that address the main drivers of domestic radicalization, such as political inclusion and religious freedom. Although an imperfect instrument, U.S. security assistance-and the specific subset of CT assistance-is a significant lever. U.S. CT assistance for Central Asia should eschew additional general lethal assistance and instead scope security attention toward border security intelligence and physical capacity enhancements. This CT aid should be paired with important, complementary socioeconomic programs that help with countering violent extremism, including greater religious and political openness along with support for the Central Asian diaspora.