This comprehensive, in-depth assessment of the German foreign policy record under the Red-Green government of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer from 1998 to 2005, produced by a team of German and international experts, explores the idea of continuity and the sources, depths and directions of German foreign policy.

Seminar paper from the year 2009 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: German Foreign Policy, grade: 72 (distinction), Durham University (SGIA), language: English, abstract: Die Arbeit behandelt die Frage, ob die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nach wie vor als diejenige einer sog. "Zivilmacht" angesehen werden kann. Hierzu wird nach einer kurzen Einführung auf die Entstehungsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik sowie die Eigenschaften des "Zivilmacht"-Konzeptes eingegangen. Im Anschluss daran werden die entscheidenden Ereignisse beleuchtet, die zu der Erosion des "Zivilmacht"-Konzeptes geführt haben, insb. das deutsche Engagement im Kosovo (1999) und in Afghanistan, sowie das "Nein" zum Irakkrieg. The essay deals with the question of whether the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany may still be considered that of a so-called "civilian power". Following a brief introduction, the history of the Federal Republic and the characteristics of the "civilian power" concept are discussed. Subsequently, the decisive events that led to the erosion of the "civilian power" concept, especially the German engagement in Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan, as well as the "no" to the war in Iraq make up the second part.

A vision of a European future of peace and stability despite the present gloom The world appears to be at another major turning point. Tensions between the United States and China threaten a resumption of great power conflict. Global institutions are being tested as never before, and hard-edged nationalism has resurfaced as a major force in both democracies and authoritarian states. From the European perspective, the United States appears to be abdicating its global leadership role. Meanwhile, Moscow and Beijing eagerly exploit every opportunity to pit European partners against one another. But a pivot point also offers the continent an opportunity to grow stronger. In World in Danger, Wolfgang Ischinger, Germany's most prominent diplomat, offers a vision of a European future of peace and stability. Ischinger examines the root causes of the current conflicts and suggests how Europe can successfully address the most urgent challenges facing the continent. The European Union, he suggests, is poised to become a more powerful actor on the world stage, able to shape global politics while defending the interests of its 500 million citizens. This important book offers a practical vision of a Europe fully capable of navigating these turbulent times.

Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine, Donald Trump’s presidency and instability in the Middle East are just a few of the factors that have brought an end to the immediate post-Cold War belief that a new international order was emerging: one where fear and uncertainty gave way to a thick normative and institutional architecture that diminished the importance of material power. This has raised questions about the instruments we use to understand order in Europe and in international relations. The chapters in this book aim to assess whether foreign policy actors in Europe understand the international system and behave as realists. They ask what drives their behaviour, how they construct material capabilities and to what extent they see material power as the means to ensure survival. They contribute to a critical assessment of realism as a way to understand both Europe’s current predicament and the contemporary international system.

Why the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past Can great powers be confident that their peers have benign intentions? States that trust each other can live at peace; those that mistrust each other are doomed to compete for arms and allies and may even go to war. Sebastian Rosato explains that states routinely lack the kind of information they need to be convinced that their rivals mean them no harm. Even in cases that supposedly involved mutual trust—Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era; Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement; France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period; and the Soviet Union and United States at the end of the Cold War—the protagonists mistrusted each other and struggled for advantage. Rosato argues that the ramifications of his argument for U.S.–China relations are profound: the future of great power politics is likely to resemble its dismal past.

A surge of political trends and upheavals all over the world confronts German foreign policy with a world that is dramatically different from Berlin Republic unification in 1990. Brexit, American de-commitment to Europe and the rise of isolationist, populist forces within Germany as well as in other European countries and the U.S. have undermined the foundations of Germany's foreign policy. Germany is suddenly faced with another historical shift that is starting to shake the bedrock of its foreign policy. A council of experts for strategic foresight can address Germany's strategic cultural deficit, its civilian power fixation, its resorts principle of ministerial independence, and its coalition governance conflicts.