Essay from the year 2019 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: Near East, Near Orient, grade: 68, University of Winchester, language: English, abstract: This paper is going to tackle whether Bush’s 2002 articulation of an "Axis of Evil" in fighting the 'war on terror' was a mistake or not. To answer this question, this essay will look at Iraq as an example because Iraq was invaded by the US in 2003. On the one hand, Bush’s articulation that the "Axis of Evil" could be seen as helpful in fighting the war on terror as the US argued, that Iraq had acquired chemical weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). On the other hand, invading Iraq could have been a huge mistake because the problem of Al-Qaeda became stronger and there were many terror attacks in Europa after the Iraq invasion. Thus, the "Axis of Evil" could be helpful, but there were some problematic things. This essay will first explore, what the "Axis of Evil" was. Then the essay will turn to illustrate the question if a state can be a terrorist. It will argue what evidence there is that a state is involved in terrorism. Finally, this essay will discuss the outcome of the 'war on terror', and conclude if the invasion of the Iraq by the US was a mistake or not. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on the 11th September 2001 represent a symbolic declaration of war by Islamic fundamentalists to Western civilization. However, in January 2002, George W. Bush in his speech to the Washington Post demonstrated the existence of an international "Axis of Evil" by addressing North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Further, under Secretary of State John Bolton said that Cuba, Libya and Syria could be grouped with these as rogue states. Bush added that states like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil.

In this bestselling book the author goes behind the scenes with President George W. Bush and his teams as they lead the nation on a new kind of war.

Foreign policy success or failure is often attributed to the role of leadership. This volume explores the relationship between President George W. Bush's leadership, the administration's stated belief in the power of ideas (and the ideas of power) and its approach to the war on terror. Drawing on the international expertise of ten American foreign policy and security specialists, this incisive and timely book combines theoretical perspectives on political leadership with rigorous empirical analysis of selected aspects of the Bush administration's post 9/11 foreign policy. As a result, this book sheds considerable light not just on the limited impact of President Bush's war on terror strategy, but also, more importantly, on why key ideas underpinning the strategy, such as US global primacy and pre-emptive war, largely failed to gel in a globalizing world.

After 9/11, President Bush reassured Americans and the world that he would lead the fight against terror aggressively and unremittingly until Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida were crushed. Since then his actions have fallen short, and he has apparently lost sight of the mission. In his new book, former FBI counterintelligence specialist and CNN analyst William Turner portrays the White House as an administration of broken promises, insufficient planning, failed diplomacy, misplaced priorities and suspect motives, and hammers Bush for selling the invasion of Iraq as part of the War on Terror, when in fact Iraq had no WMD and posed no threat.

Hartenian’s history of George W Bush propaganda for an invasion of Iraq returns the administration’s approach to its conceptual origins. Hartenian places "evidence" in the center of his analysis, showing that Rumsfeld’s "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" meant that no evidence was necessary to justify an invasion. The 9/11 attacks, indeed, "changed everything" for the Bush administration and in its aftermath the time for regime change in Iraq had simply come. With no good evidence to support its fears, the administration was certain of a post-9/11-conceived Iraq–al Qaeda "nexus," just as with no evidence except the "absence of evidence" it was certain of Iraqi mastery of "denial and deception" that hid "Saddam’s" "evil" activities. Resting on Cheney’s "one percent doctrine," administration "certainty" of the threat from Iraq required a US invasion. The policy offices of Douglas Feith at the Pentagon, with the help of George Tenet at CIA, would generate a case of such fright and enormity—the "mushroom cloud"—that required administration action. Manipulating intelligence and ignoring the growing body of evidence undermining its case, the Bush administration invaded Iraq to bring about "regime change."

After Osama bin Laden, leader of the Islamic militant group al-Qaeda, took responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush launched a battle against violent extremist organizations that threatened the security of America. His fight against terrorism sent millions of US troops into battle in Afghanistan and Iraq. This book looks at how President Bush led the War on Terror, the challenges and success of these efforts, and how his actions have shaped the world we live in today. Sidebars and quotes highlight key events, while full-color photos and straightforward, yet compelling text bring this very recent war to life for readers.

The Axis of Evil institutionalized a new rhetoric of morality in international affairs which, at least in appearance, mirrors the ideological aspirations of George W. Bush and his neo-Conservative policy advisors. In its fight against evil, the US has economically and politically broken the Soviet Union, waged war against Afghanistan, toppled the Taliban regime, confronted Al-Qaeda ad threatened Syria, Iran and Northern Korea. But what is this notion of evil which has become part of the language of international politics? What are its historical origins and its moral, political and legal foundations? Is the fight against evil merely a new form of imperialism? against its potency as a tool for policy makers. He concludes that the greatest danger in combating the acts and individuals, broadly defined as evil, lies in a failure to grasp their true and varied nature in favour of attempts to blow evil away with unprecedented might.