In 1986, the Congress called for the establishment of a joint service special operations capability under a single command. In April 1987, the Secretary of Defense established the Special Operations Command with the mission to provide trained and combat-ready special operations forces to DOD s geographic combatant commands. Section 167(e) of Title 10, U.S. Code directs that the Commander of the Special Operations Command be responsible for and have the authority to conduct all affairs of such command related to special operations activities. Under this section, the Commander is also responsible for and has the authority to conduct certain functions relating to special operations activities whether or not they relate to the Special Operations Command, including: preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assigned to the Special Operations Command; exercising authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds; training assigned forces; and monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of special operations forces officers. In addition, Section 167 directs the Special Operations Command to be responsible for the following activities as they relate to special operations: (1) direct action, (2) strategic reconnaissance, (3) unconventional warfare, (4) foreign internal defense, (5) civil affairs, (6) psychological operations, (7) counterterrorism, (8) humanitarian assistance, (9) theater search and rescue, and (10) other activities such as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 9 Appendix II defines these activities assigned to the Special Operations Command. DOD has also assigned additional activities to the Special Operations Command.

A report to congressional committees regarding the DoD¿s progress in implementing GAO's recommendations over the last 7 years. During this period of time, GAO issued 637 reports to DoD that included 2,726 recommendations. By law, agencies, including DoD, are required to submit written statements explaining actions taken in response to recommendations that have been made. This report contains the results of an analysis on the implementation status of the 2,726 recommendations made to DoD in reports issued during FY 2001 through 2007. Includes examples of related financial accomplishments reported for the period, based on DoD-related work. Illustrations.

GAO-06-812 Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role

In October and November of 2001, small numbers of soldiers from the Army Special Forces entered Afghanistan, linked up with elements of the Northern Alliance (an assortment of Afghanis opposed to the Taliban), and, in a remarkably short period of time, destroyed the Taliban regime. Trained to work with indigenous forces and personnel like the Northern Alliance, these soldiers, sometimes riding on horseback, combined modern military technology with ancient techniques of central Asian warfare in what was later described as "the first cavalry charge of the twenty-first century." In this engaging book, two national security experts and Department of Defense insiders put the exploits of America's special operation forces in historical and strategic context. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb offer an incisive overview of America's turbulent experience with special operations. Using in-depth interviews with special operators at the forefront of the current war on terrorism and providing a detailed account of how they are selected and trained, the authors illustrate the diversity of modern special operations forces and the strategic value of their unique attributes. From the first chapter, this book builds toward a set of recommendations for reforms that would allow special operations forces to make a greater contribution to the war on terrorism and play a more strategic role in safeguarding the nation's security. Along the way, the authors explain why special operations forces are:" Distinguished by characteristics not equally valued by their own leadership" Strategically crucial because of two mutually supporting but undeniably distinct sets of capabilities not found in conventional forces" Not to be confused with the CIA and so-called paramilitary forces, nor with the Marines and other elite forces" Unable to learn from the 1993 failed intervention in Somalia and the national-oversight issues it revealed" Better integrated into the nation's military strategy and operations than ever before but confused about their core missions in the war on terror" Not "transformed" for future challenges as many assert but rather in need of organizational reforms to realize their strategic potential Despite longstanding and growing public fascination with special operators, these individuals and the organizations that employ them are little understood. With this book, Tucker and Lamb dispel common misconceptions and offer a penetrating analysis of how these unique and valuable forces can be employed to even better effect in the future.

This book investigates the use and utility of military force in modern war. After the Cold War, Western armed forces have increasingly been called upon to intervene in internal conflicts in the former Third World. These forces have been called upon to carry out missions that they traditionally have not been trained and equipped for, in environments that they often have not been prepared for. A number of these ‘new’ types of operations in allegedly ‘new’ wars stand out, such as peace enforcement, state-building, counter-insurgency, humanitarian aid, and not the least counter-terrorism. The success rate of these missions has, however, been mixed, providing fuel for an increasingly loud debate on the utility of force in modern war. This edited volume poses as its central question: what is in fact the utility of force? Is force useful for anything other than a complete conventional defeat of a regular opponent, who is confronted in the open field? This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, war and conflict studies, counter-insurgency, security studies and IR. Isabelle Duyvesteyn is an Associate Professor at the Department of History of International Relations, Utrecht University in the Netherlands. Jan Angstrom is a researcher at the Swedish National Defence College.

This book provides an in-depth analysis of UK-US intelligence cooperation in the post-9/11 world. Seeking to connect an analysis of intelligence liaison with the wider realm of Anglo-American Relations, the book draws on a wide range of interviews and consultations with key actors in both countries. The book is centred around two critical and empirical case studies, focusing on the interactions on the key issues of counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) counter-proliferation. These case studies provide substantive insights into a range of interactions such as 9/11, the 7/7 London bombings, the A.Q. Khan nuclear network, the prelude to the 2003 Iraq War, extraordinary rendition and special forces deployments. Drawing on over 60 interviews conducted in the UK and US with prominent decision-makers and practitioners, these issues are examined in the contemporary historical context, with the main focus being on the years 2000-05. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, foreign policy, security studies and International Relations in general. Adam Svendsen has a Phd in International History from the University of Warwick. He has been a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, and has contributed to the International Security Programme at Chatham House and to the work of IISS, London.