Comprises lectures given at Tel Aviv University and Oxford University in 1990.

It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.

Introduces the game-theoretic approach of modelling economic behaviour and interaction, focusing on concepts and ideas from the field of game-theoretic models which find commonly used applications in economics. This book provides the reader with skills necessary to formalize economic games and to make them accessible for game theoretic analysis.

This volume in the Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Second Edition, combines the main features of Game Theory, covering most of the fundamental theoretical aspects under the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, with the procedures of Agent-Based Modeling for studying complex systems composed of a large number of interacting entities with many degrees of freedom. In Game Theory, the cooperative approach focuses on the possible outcomes of the decision-makers’ interaction by abstracting from the "rational" actions or decisions that may lead to these outcomes. The non-cooperative approach focuses on the actions that the decision-makers can take. As John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern argued in their path-breaking book of 1944 entitled Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, most economic questions should be analyzed as games. The models of game theory are abstract representations of a number of real-life situations and have applications to economics, political science, computer science, evolutionary biology, social psychology, and law among others. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is a relatively new computational modeling paradigm which aims to construct the computational counterpart of a conceptual model of the system under study on the basis of discrete entities (i.e., the agent) with some properties and behavioral rules, and then to simulate them in a computer to mimic the real phenomena. Given the relative immaturity of this modeling paradigm, and the broad spectrum of disciplines in which it is applied, a clear cut and widely accepted definition of high level concepts of agents, environment, interactions and so on, is still lacking. This volume explores the state-of-the-art in the development of a real ABM ontology to address the epistemological issues related to this emerging paradigm for modeling complex systems.

This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.

Architects and engineers can build models to test their ideas - why not managers? In Game Theory in Management: Modelling Business Decisions and Their Consequences, author Michael Hatfield presents a series of mathematically structured analogies to real-life business and economic interaction scenarios, and then, using modern game theory, he shows how to test common managerial technical approaches for their effectiveness. His results are astonishing: if game theory is correct then many commonly-held and taught management approaches and techniques are not only less effective than thought, they are actually detrimental in many areas where they are held to be beneficial. Game Theory in Management also examines managerial implications from network theory, cartage schemes, risk management theory, management information system epistemology, and other areas where the quantification and testing of business decisions can be employed to identify winning and losing stratagems. While the topic may seem complex, Game Theory in Management is a readable and fast-paced book; readers will come away with an entirely new perspective on the objectives, tactics, even purpose of management, and ways of evaluating the selected strategies and decisions of those within the team, inside the macro organization, and among competitors. Easily-employed tests for the validity and efficacy of management information systems are also addressed, as are those environments where cartage schemes can be most effective, and where they are not. In the areas of asset, project, and strategic management, Game Theory in Management is certain to become a game-changer.

An introduction to one of the most powerful tools in modern economics Game Theory for Applied Economists introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works too abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building—of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.