A comprehensive review of historical insurgencies that ended in settlement after a military stalemate shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a “master narrative” of seven steps executed in a common sequence. Such a narrative could help guide and assess the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw.

A standard text on social conflict, which covers key research in the field. This edition has been updated and rewritten, with new co-author Sung Hee Kim, and now emphasizes cross-cultural conflict and includes recent research in conflict escalation, stalemate, negotiation and settlement.

This is a re-typeset version of the 3rd edition of Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. The typeset version was created using OCR from scanned pages. Please notify Dean Pruitt (at [email protected]) or Paul Pruitt (at [email protected]) if you discover any errors. We can correct them and rerelease this edition.

This book evaluates the role of international mediators in bringing civil wars to an end and makes the case for ‘powerful peacemaking’ – using incentives and sanctions – to leverage parties into peace. As internal violence within countries is a hugely significant threat to international peace in the post-Cold War era, the question of how these wars end has become an urgent research and policy question. This volume explores a critical aspect of peacemaking that has yet to be sufficiently evaluated: the turbulent period beyond the onset of formal or open negotiations to end civil wars and the clinching of an initially sustainable negotiated settlement. The book argues that the transnational flow of weapons, resources, and ideas means that when civil wars today end, they are more likely to do so at the negotiating table than on the battlefield. It uses bargaining theory to develop an analytical framework to evaluate peace processes – moving from stalemate in wars to negotiated settlement – and it rigorously analyses the experiences of five cases of negotiated transitions from war and the role of international mediators: South Africa, Liberia, Burundi, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka.

Jensen explores the long-standing conflict over the sovereignty of Western Sahara-from its colonial roots to its present manifestation as a political stalemate.

After a war breaks out, what factors influence the warring parties' decisions about whether to talk to their enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? How do we get from only fighting to also talking? In The Costs of Conversation, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that states are primarily concerned with the strategic costs of conversation, and these costs need to be low before combatants are willing to engage in direct talks with their enemy. Specifically, Mastro writes, leaders look to two factors when determining the probable strategic costs of demonstrating a willingness to talk: the likelihood the enemy will interpret openness to diplomacy as a sign of weakness, and how the enemy may change its strategy in response to such an interpretation. Only if a state thinks it has demonstrated adequate strength and resiliency to avoid the inference of weakness, and believes that its enemy has limited capacity to escalate or intensify the war, will it be open to talking with the enemy. Through four primary case studies—North Vietnamese diplomatic decisions during the Vietnam War, those of China in the Korean War and Sino-Indian War, and Indian diplomatic decision making in the latter conflict—The Costs of Conversation demonstrates that the costly conversations thesis best explains the timing and nature of countries' approach to wartime talks, and therefore when peace talks begin. As a result, Mastro's findings have significant theoretical and practical implications for war duration and termination, as well as for military strategy, diplomacy, and mediation.