This monograph examines Chinese warfare and suggests that three and a half millennia of Chinese military history have produced a distinctive and enduring Chinese Way Of War. While the art and science of war in China have evolved considerably throughout its history, the characteristics and philosophies of its style of warfare contain some propensities that endure from antiquity to the present. They are: The Chinese military orientation focuses more on the strategic and operational levels of war than the tactical. The Chinese prefer strategic maneuver warfare to attritional or other forms of warfare. Chinese warfare emphasizes the importance of shaping operations, the arrangement of the conditions of the war, campaign, or battlefield in one’s favor before initiating combat. Finally, deception and unorthodox warfare play a leading role in Chinese martial philosophy and conduct of war. These four propensities of the Chinese way of war are general trends that emerge when the entire span of Chinese warfare is broadly considered. Rooted in the philosophy and theories of the great military classics of ancient Chinese, these propensities provide continuities in the war fighting styles, traditions, and preferences of Chinese armies throughout history. While none of the four propensities of Chinese warfare are practiced by China alone, when aggregated they form a broad approach to war fighting that is unlike that of any other country in the world. The distinctiveness of the Chinese way of war is a product of China’s unique cultural traditions, religious and social philosophies, and historical evolution.

Special Operations Success establishes a new benchmark in military theory in this deeply analytic and innovative work. It answers several pressing questions: How successful have American special operations been over the past quarter-century? Are special forces fated to cycles of expansion and misuse? Will special forces invariably exceed the authorities granted to them because of they are? Is a general theory of special operations feasible given the range of activities and conditions that fall under the category? Kiras' work is based on two decades of practical, teaching, and consulting experience within different special operations communities, and its analysis and conclusions are designed to inform practitioners, policymakers, educators, and the general public. The book develops a framework, in the form of a theory comprising capabilities and control, for the comprehensively evaluating special operations success, and is divided into three parts: Part I lays the foundation for a general theory of special operations, Part II explores the two component parts of theory, capabilities and control, and Part III uses various aspects of the theory, depending on available information, to assess the success of special operations over a twenty-year period in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the United States.

Includes over 50 photos and 30 maps. THIS IS THE THIRD in a series of five volumes dealing with the operations of the United States Marine Corps in Korea during the period 2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume III presents in detail the operations of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a part of X Corps, USA, in the Chosin Reservoir campaign. The time covered in this book extends from the administrative landing at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 to the Hungnam evacuation which ended on Christmas Eve. The record would not be complete, however, without reference to preceding high-level strategic decisions in Washington and Tokyo which placed the Marines in northeast Korea and governed their employment. “THE BREAKOUT of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir area will long be remembered as one of the inspiring epics of our history. It is also worthy of consideration as a campaign in the best tradition of American military annals. The ability of the Marines to fight their way through twelve Chinese divisions over a 78-mile mountain road in sub-zero weather cannot be explained by courage and endurance alone. It also owed to the high degree of professional forethought and skill as well as the “uncommon valor” expected of all Marines. When the danger was greatest, the 1st Marine Division might have accepted an opportunity for air evacuation of troops after the destruction of weapons and supplies to keep them from falling into the enemy’s hands. But there was never a moment’s hesitation. The decision of the commander and the determination of all hands to come out fighting with all essential equipment were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Marine Corps.”- Gen. Pate

This book examines Chinese warfare and suggests that three and a half millennia of Chinese military history have produced a distinctive and enduring Chinese way of war. While the art and science of war in China have evolved considerably throughout its history, the characteristics and philosophies of its style of warfare contain some propensities that endure from antiquity to the present. They are: The Chinese military orientation focuses more on the strategic and operational levels of war than the tactical. The Chinese prefer strategic maneuver warfare to attritional or other forms of warfare. Chinese warfare emphasizes the importance of shaping operations, the arrangement of the conditions of the war, campaign, or battlefield in one's favor before initiating combat. Finally, deception and unorthodox warfare play a leading role in Chinese martial philosophy and conduct of war. These four propensities of the Chinese way of war are general trends that emerge when the entire span of Chinese warfare is broadly considered. Rooted in the philosophy and theories of the great military classics of ancient Chinese, these propensities provide continuities in the warfighting styles, traditions, and preferences of Chinese armies throughout history. While none of the four propensities of Chinese warfare are practiced by China alone, when aggregated they form a broad approach to warfighting that is unlike that of any other country in the world. The distinctiveness of the Chinese way of war is a product of China's unique cultural traditions, religious and social philosophies, and historical evolution.

Includes more than 40 maps, plans and illustrations. This volume in the official History of the Marine Corps chronicles the part played by United States Marines in the Chosin Reservoir Campaign. The race to the Yalu was on. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s strategic triumph at Inchon and the subsequent breakout of the U.S. Eighth Army from the Pusan Perimeter and the recapture of Seoul had changed the direction of the war. Only the finishing touches needed to be done to complete the destruction of the North Korean People’s Army. Moving up the east coast was the independent X Corps, commanded by Major General Edward M. Almond, USA. The 1st Marine Division, under Major General Oliver P. Smith, was part of X Corps and had been so since the 15 September 1950 landing at Inchon. After Seoul the 1st Marine Division had reloaded into its amphibious ships and had swung around the Korean peninsula to land at Wonsan on the east coast. The landing on 26 October 1950 met no opposition; the port had been taken from the land side by the resurgent South Korean army. The date was General Smith’s 57th birthday, but he let it pass unnoticed. Two days later he ordered Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., 47, to move his 7th Marine Regimental Combat Team north from Wonsan to Hamhung. Smith was then to prepare for an advance to the Manchurian border, 135 miles distant. And so began one of the Marine Corps’ greatest battles—or, as the Corps would call it, the “Chosin Reservoir Campaign.” The Marines called it the “Chosin” Reservoir because that is what their Japanese-based maps called it. The South Koreans, nationalistic sensibilities disturbed, preferred—and, indeed, would come to insist—that it be called the “Changjin” Reservoir.

From the New York Times bestselling author of Blood and Thunder and Ghost Soldiers, a chronicle of the extraordinary feats of heroism by Marines called on to do the impossible during the greatest battle of the Korean War. "Superb ... A masterpiece of thorough research, deft pacing and arresting detail...This war story—the fight to break out of a frozen hell near the Chosin Reservoir—has been told many times before. But Sides tells it exceedingly well, with fresh research, gritty scenes and cinematic sweep." —The Washington Post On October 15, 1950, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of UN troops in Korea, convinced President Harry Truman that the Communist forces of Kim Il-sung would be utterly defeated by Thanksgiving. The Chinese, he said with near certainty, would not intervene in the war. As he was speaking, 300,000 Red Chinese soldiers began secretly crossing the Manchurian border. Led by some 20,000 men of the First Marine Division, the Americans moved deep into the snowy mountains of North Korea, toward the trap Mao had set for the vainglorious MacArthur along the frozen shores of the Chosin Reservoir. What followed was one of the most heroic--and harrowing--operations in American military history, and one of the classic battles of all time. Faced with probable annihilation, and temperatures plunging to 20 degrees below zero, the surrounded, and hugely outnumbered, Marines fought through the enemy forces with ferocity, ingenuity, and nearly unimaginable courage as they marched their way to the sea. Hampton Sides' superb account of this epic clash relies on years of archival research, unpublished letters, declassified documents, and interviews with scores of Marines and Koreans who survived the siege. While expertly detailing the follies of the American leaders, On Desperate Ground is an immediate, grunt's-eye view of history, enthralling in its narrative pace and powerful in its portrayal of what ordinary men are capable of in the most extreme circumstances. Hampton Sides has been hailed by critics as one of the best nonfiction writers of his generation. As the Miami Herald wrote, "Sides has a novelist's eye for the propulsive elements that lend momentum and dramatic pace to the best nonfiction narratives."

Chronicles the first seven months of the war, drawing on the personal stories of hundreds of veterans and battalion and regimental records from the National Archives.