This book explores the role of France in the events leading up to the end of the Cold War and German unification. --from publisher description.

The greatest threat to the Western alliance in the 1960s did not come from an enemy, but from an ally. France, led by its mercurial leader General Charles de Gaulle, launched a global and comprehensive challenge to the United State’s leadership of the Free World, tackling not only the political but also the military, economic, and monetary spheres. Successive American administrations fretted about de Gaulle, whom they viewed as an irresponsible nationalist at best and a threat to their presence in Europe at worst. Based on extensive international research, this book is an original analysis of France’s ambitious grand strategy during the 1960s and why it eventually failed. De Gaulle’s failed attempt to overcome the Cold War order reveals important insights about why the bipolar international system was able to survive for so long, and why the General’s legacy remains significant to current French foreign policy.

Part I. The era of frustration (1945-1958) -- France's difficult entry into the Cold War -- French powerlessness -- Part II. Challenging the status quo (1958-1969) -- Re-establishing France's "rank"--Challenging the established order -- The apogee of de Gaulle's grand policy -- Part III. Imanaging de Gaulle's legacy (1969-1981) -- Opting for continuity -- The education of a president -- Part IV. The end of the Cold War (1981-1995) -- New Cold War, new detente -- The end of "Yalta" -- Part V. France and globalization (1995-2015) -- In search of a multipolar world -- Charts

As France begins to confront the new challenges of the post-Cold War era, the time has come to examine how French security policy has evolved since Charles de Gaulle set it on an independent course in the 1960s. Philip Gordon shows that the Gaullist model, contrary to widely held beliefs, has lived on--but that its inherent inconsistencies have grown more acute with increasing European unification, the diminishing American military role in Europe, and related strains on French military budgets. The question today is whether the Gaullist legacy will enable a strong and confident France to play a full role in Europe's new security arrangements or whether France, because of its will to independence, is destined to play an isolated, national role. Gordon analyzes military doctrines, strategies, and budgets from the 1960s to the 1990s, and also the evolution of French policy from the early debates about NATO and the European Community to the Persian Gulf War. He reveals how and why Gaullist ideas have for so long influenced French security policy and examines possible new directions for France in an increasingly united but potentially unstable Europe.

Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era examines the question of foreign policy change through a comparative analysis of the Great Powers' reactions to the transformations in international relations after the Cold War. Contributors describe and explain the efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, China, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada to redefine the role they play in an environment that has become internally and externally more uncertain.

Examines the role of the U.S. in NATO. The author finds the sources of many current problems and singles out two basic weaknesses: the failure of the European NATO Allies to form a European defense community, and the parallel U.S. decision to rest NATO's defense on U.S. nuclear forces. Suggests some directions for NATO strategy, force posture, arms control policies, and East-West relations. Photos, tables and figures. Glossary. Index.