Wilfred Kohl analyzes the development of France's atomic force, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in de Gaulle's policies and its impact on French relations with NATO, her key alliance partners (the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany), and the U.S.S.R. He emphasizes the discontinuity between de Gaulle's grandiose designs and the more modest programs envisaged by cither the preceding governments of the Fourth Republic or the succeeding Pompidou government. Originally published in 1972. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The legacy of World War II and the division of Eastern and Western Europe produced a radical asymmetry, and a variety of misgivings and misunderstandings, in French and German experiences of the nuclear age. At the same time, however, political actors in both nations continually labored to reconcile their differences and engage in productive strategic dialogue. Grounded in cutting-edge research and freshly discovered archival sources, France, Germany, and Nuclear Deterrence teases out the paradoxical nuclear interactions between France and Germany from 1954 to the present day.

Part I. The era of frustration (1945-1958) -- France's difficult entry into the Cold War -- French powerlessness -- Part II. Challenging the status quo (1958-1969) -- Re-establishing France's "rank"--Challenging the established order -- The apogee of de Gaulle's grand policy -- Part III. Imanaging de Gaulle's legacy (1969-1981) -- Opting for continuity -- The education of a president -- Part IV. The end of the Cold War (1981-1995) -- New Cold War, new detente -- The end of "Yalta" -- Part V. France and globalization (1995-2015) -- In search of a multipolar world -- Charts

The greatest threat to the Western alliance in the 1960s did not come from an enemy, but from an ally. France, led by its mercurial leader General Charles de Gaulle, launched a global and comprehensive challenge to the United State’s leadership of the Free World, tackling not only the political but also the military, economic, and monetary spheres. Successive American administrations fretted about de Gaulle, whom they viewed as an irresponsible nationalist at best and a threat to their presence in Europe at worst. Based on extensive international research, this book is an original analysis of France’s ambitious grand strategy during the 1960s and why it eventually failed. De Gaulle’s failed attempt to overcome the Cold War order reveals important insights about why the bipolar international system was able to survive for so long, and why the General’s legacy remains significant to current French foreign policy.

France is a Pacific power, with three territories, a military presence, and extensive investments. Once seen by many as a colonial interloper in the South Pacific, by the early 2000s, after it ended nuclear testing in French Polynesia and negotiated transitional Accords responding to independence demands in New Caledonia, France seems to have become generally accepted as a regional partner, even if its efforts concentrate on its own territories rather than the independent island states. But Frances future in the region has yet to be secured. By 2014 it is to have handed over a set of agreed autonomies to the New Caledonian government, before an independence referendum process begins. Past experience suggests that a final resolution of the status of New Caledonia will be divisive and could lead once again to violent confrontations. In French Polynesia, calls continue for independence and for treatment under UN decolonisation procedures, which France opposes. Other island leaders are watching, so far putting faith in the Noumea Accord, but wary of the final stages. The issues and possible solutions are more complex than the French Pacific island population of 515,000 would suggest. Combining historical background with political and economic analysis, this comprehensive study offers vital insight into the intricate history -- and problematic future -- of several of Australias key neighbours in the Pacific and to the priorities and options of the European country that still rules them. It is aimed at policy-makers, scholars, journalists, businesspeople, and others who want to familiarise themselves with the issues as Frances role in the region is redefined in the years to come.

What were the calculations made by the US and its major allies in the 1960s when they faced the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? These were all states with the technological and financial capabilities to develop and possess nuclear weapons should they wish to do so. In the end, only the United Kingdom and France became nuclear weapon states. Eventually, all of them joined the non-proliferation regime. Leading American, British, Canadian, French, German and Japanese scholars consider key questions that faced the signatories to the NPT: How imperative was nuclear deterrence in facing the perceived threat to their country? How reliable did they think the US extended deterrence was, and how costly would an independent deterrent be both financially and politically? Was there a regional option? How much future was there in the civilian nuclear energy sector for their country and what role would the NPT play in this area? What capabilities needed to be preserved for the country’s future and how could this be made compatible with the NPT? What were the determining factors of deciding whether to join the NPT?

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.