"This manual covers the tactical employment of the light and medium tank battalions both as part of a larger force and when acting independently. It is designed as a guide only and does not lay down a set of inflexible rules. Each tactical situation must be solved on its own merits and the initiative of individual commanders must be encouraged. Although not written specifically for the separate tank battalions, the fundamentals covered herein and formations shown are generally applicable to those units."

“With its focus on tank crew members and their commanders this is a unique addition to the literature on WWII.” —A. Harding Ganz, Associate Professor Emeritus of the Ohio State University at Newark, author of Ghost Division After the shocking fall of France in June 1940, the U.S. Army embarked on a crash program to establish a new armored force. One of the units formed was the 756th Tank Battalion (Light), activated at Fort Lewis in June 1941. Because of severe equipment shortages, the new battalion trained without tanks for several months, but by early 1942 were equipped with new M3 light tanks. While companies A and C took part in Operation Torch, B was withheld for lack of cargo space in the transport ships and rejoined the battalion two months later in North Africa. The units undertook reconnaissance missions following the landings in Salerno. In December 1943 the battalion was ordered to upgrade to a medium tank (Sherman) unit. Given less than a month to reorganize and train in M4s, the battalion was sent into the Mignano Gap and supported the 34th Infantry Division in the capture of Cervaro and Monte Trocchio. B Company also supported the troops of the 100th Battalion on bloody but ill-fated attempts to cross the Rapido river before finally establishing a secure bridgehead. The nearby town of Caira was also captured, opening an avenue for an attack on Cassino. Based on decades of research, and hours of interviews with veterans of the 756th Tank Battalion, Jeff Danby’s vivid narrative puts the reader in the turret of B Company’s Shermans as they ride into battle. “The level of detail is impressive.” —WWII History Magazine

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine.Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces.Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.

The 1st Armored Division was the first American armored unit to enter combat against German panzer divisions in World War II. A product of the contentious mechanization process between the First and Second World Wars, the division soon found itself to be outmatched by its German foe. Following a relatively easy victory against the Vichy French after the amphibious landings of Operation Torch, the division lost a series of battles to the Germans, culminating in a decisive defeat at Kasserine Pass. Doctrine (both institutional and equipment), training, and battle command all proved to be problematic for the division. The central question is: Did the 1st Armored Division lose the battle of Kasserine Pass because of deficiencies in American armor doctrine, training, or battle command? An analysis of the Tunisian campaign focusing on these three areas demonstrates that faulty training and inept battle command were partially responsible for the division’s defeat; however, the primary reason the 1st Armored Division lost the battle of Kasserine Pass was that it operated in accordance with flawed institutional doctrine and utilized inferior equipment.

Tanks, amphibian tanks, and amphibian tractors in action in all theaters, from Africa and Europe to the Pacific How the battalions fought the war, often in the tankers' own words Crystal-clear maps The U.S. Army's separate armored battalions fought in obscurity by comparison with the flashy armored divisions, but they carried the heavier burden in the grim struggle against the Axis in World War II. The battalions participated in every armored amphibious assault that the army conducted. They did most of the bloody work in Italy, made vital contributions in France, and constituted the entire effort in the Pacific.

Loss and Redemption at St Vith closes a gap in the record of the Battle of the Bulge by recounting the exploits of the 7th Armored Division in a way that no other study has. Most accounts of the Battle of the Bulge give short-shrift to the interval during which the German forward progress stopped and the American counterattack began. This narrative centers on the 7th Armored Division for the entire length of the campaign, in so doing reconsidering the story of the whole battle through the lens of a single division and accounting for the reconstitution of the Division while in combat.