Five years after the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act: stopping terrorist travel : hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, December 9, 2009.

The Intell. Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was the most significant legislation affecting the U.S. intell. community since the National Security Act of 1947. The 2004 act attempted to ensure closer coordination among intell. agencies espec. in regard to counter-terrorism efforts. It established the position of Dir. of National Intell. (DNI) to coordinate the nation¿s intell. effort. The DNI speaks for U.S. intell., briefs the Pres., has authority to develop the budget for the national intell. effort and manage appropriations made by Congress, and can transfer personnel and funds from one agency to another. Contents of this report: Intro.; Background; The Intell. Reform Act of 2004; Positive Assessment; Negative Views; Alternative Views; Future Direction.

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The United States faces a constantly evolving threat from terrorist organizations and individuals who wish to do harm to do harm to its assets and citizens. In 2004, as a response to the 9/11 attacks, the structural organization of the agencies that comprise the U.S. Intelligence Community was changed under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The goal of the transformation was to enhance the ability and effectiveness of those that are supposed to maintain national security. Coordination and information sharing between the agencies in the IC is essential to ensure that the relevant actors have the knowledge and authority necessary to give warning, take action, and adequately inform policy makers. Many of the agencies in the Intelligence Community share overlapping responsibilities, yet also have their own unique and specific purposes. They fall under several different cabinet level departments, and must accommodate widely varied leadership structures and policy guidelines. However, in accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act the Intelligence Community has been directed to operate under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence. Based on the community's current organizational structure derived from the IRTPA, this paper evaluates if and how the Director of National Intelligence and the Intelligence Community will be successful in enhancing cohesion. The findings illustrate that, because of the structure and the authority granted to the Director, adequate coordination among agencies is unlikely. Furthermore, this paper shows that designing a policy that focuses on and empowers middle managers will provide the ideal solution. A solution in which a synthesis of top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation is the most practical model.

The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, collectively constitute the most significant bureaucratic shakeup of the national security apparatus since the National Security Act of 1947. Roughly 10 years following the creation of DHS, questions linger as to whether these reforms have addressed the major domestic intelligence shortfalls identified in numerous post-9/11 congressional hearings and in the final report of the 9/11 Commission.This book seeks to answer those questions by examining the performance of the U.S. domestic intelligence system since 9/11 along three fronts: intelligence fusion, institutional evolution, and intelligence prioritization. Citing the literature from current and former homeland security practitioners, academic experts, non-partisan analysts, and print media commentators, this report concludes that while key measures of progress on these fronts have been observed, shortfalls within the domestic intelligence system do nevertheless remain, requiring further oversight and guidance from federal homeland security policymakers.