Financial repression (legal restrictions on interest rates, credit allocation, capital movements, and other financial operations) was widely used in the past but was largely abandoned in the liberalization wave of the 1990s, as widespread support for interventionist policies gave way to a renewed conception of government as an impartial referee. Financial repression has come back on the agenda with the surge in public debt in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and some countries have reintroduced administrative ceilings on interest rates. By distorting market incentives and signals, financial repression induces losses from inefficiency and rent-seeking that are not easily quantified. This study attempts to assess some of these losses by estimating the impact of financial repression on growth using an updated index of interest rate controls covering 90 countries over 45 years. The results suggest that financial repression poses a significant drag on growth, which could amount to 0.4-0.7 percentage points.

This books presents a theory of economic development very different from the "stages of growth" hypothesis or strategies emphasizing foreign aid, trade, or regional association. Leaving these aside, the author breaks new ground by focusing on the use of domestic capital markets to stimulate economic performance. He suggests a "bootstrap" approach in which successful development would depend largely on policy choices made by national authorities in the developing countries themselves. Central to his theory is the freeing of domestic financial markets to allow interest rates to reflect the true scarcity of capital in a developing economy. His analysis leads to a critique of prevailing monetary theory and to a new view of the relation between money and physical capital—a view with policy implications for governments striving to overcome the vicious circle of inflation and stagnation. Examining the performance of South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and other countries, the author suggests that their success or failure has depended primarily on steps taken in the monetary sector. He concludes that monetary reform should take precedence over other development measures, such as tariff and tax reform or the encouragement of foreign capital investment. In addition to challenging much of the conventional wisdom of development, the author's revision of accepted monetary theory may be relevant for mature economies that face monetary problems.

High public debt often produces the drama of default and restructuring. But debt is also reduced through financial repression, a tax on bondholders and savers via negative or belowmarket real interest rates. After WWII, capital controls and regulatory restrictions created a captive audience for government debt, limiting tax-base erosion. Financial repression is most successful in liquidating debt when accompanied by inflation. For the advanced economies, real interest rates were negative 1⁄2 of the time during 1945–1980. Average annual interest expense savings for a 12—country sample range from about 1 to 5 percent of GDP for the full 1945–1980 period. We suggest that, once again, financial repression may be part of the toolkit deployed to cope with the most recent surge in public debt in advanced economies.

Can knowledge of financial policies in developing countries over four decades help the socialist economies of Asia and Eastern Europe become open market economies in the 1990s? In all these countries the loss of fiscal and monetary control has often resulted in high inflation that undermines the liberalization process itself. In the second edition of The Order of Economic Liberalization, Ronald McKinnon builds on his influential work on the liberalization of financial markets in less developed countries and outlines the progression necessary to move from a "repressed" to an open economy. New to this edition are chapters that contrast the gradual Chinese approach to liberalizing domestic and foreign trade with the "big bang" approach followed by some Eastern European countries and republics of the former Soviet Union. Financial control and macroeconomic stability, McKinnon argues, are more critical to a successful transition than is any crash program to privatize state-owned industrial assets and the banking system.

One of the most enduring questions in economics involves how a nation could accelerate the pace of its economic development. One of the most enduring answers to this question is to promote exports -either because doing so directly influences development via encouraging production of goods for export, or because export promotion permits accumulation of foreign exchange which permits importation of high-quality goods and services, which can in turn be used to expand the nation's production possibilities. In either case, growth is said to be export-led; the latter case is the so-called "two-gap" hypothesis (McKinnon, 1964; Findlay, 1973). The early work on export-led growth consisted of static cross-country com parisons (Michaely, 1977; Balassa, 1978; Tyler, 1981; Kormendi and Meguire, 1985). These studies generally concluded that there is strong evidence in favour of export-led growth because export growth and income growth are highly correlated. However, Kravis pointed out in 1970 that the question is an essen tially dynamic one: as he put it, are exports the handmaiden or the engine of growth? To make this determination one needs to look at time series to see whether or not exports are driving income. This approach has been taken in a number of papers (Jung and Marshall, 1985; Chow, 1987; Serletis, 1992; Kunst and Marin, 1989; Marin, 1992; Afxentiou and Serletis, 1991), designed to assess whether or not individual countries exhibit statistically significant evidence of export-led growth using Granger causality tests.