Consists of a collection of individually prepared U.S. Army division World War II fact sheets updated to 1947.

The integration of armored units within the U.S. Army's infantry divisions has historically been pivotal to the success of the infantry division in combat. Currently, none of the Army's tank or mechanized infantry battalions are organized or trained to directly support the Army's light, air assault or airborne infantry divisions. The 10th Mountain Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 101st Air Assault Division and the 82nd Airborne Division currently have to draw armored support from the Army's armored or mechanized infantry divisions. This organizational shortfall is compounded by training and doctrinal issues. The most important of which is that the tank and mechanized infantry battalions within the Army's heavy divisions do not routinely train in the role of providing support to the Army's light, air assault or airborne infantry divisions. The monograph initially examines the period from 1940 until 1947, which was characterized by increasing integration of the two arms. This provides a basis for comparison with the current Army in terms of organization, doctrine and training. Subsequently, the monograph examines the changes associated with the Army's adoption of the Army of Excellence in the 1980s. This examination provides insight into how the Army currently achieves integration of its armored units and infantry divisions with respect to organization, doctrine and training. The monograph then evaluates the Army's current level of integration largely based on the Army's lessons from the Second World War. This study recommends that the Army re-allocate armored forces to directly support the Army's infantry divisions, even if this must be done at the expense of existing heavy forces. The study further recommends changes to the Army's current armored-infantry training model in order to establish habitual relationships between supporting armored units.

In the first of a three-volume study, the author presents an extremely detailed record of the organisation, doctrine and equipment of U.S. Army infantry divisions during the latter part of World War II. The second and third volumes will provide capsule histories for all U.S. Army infantry divisions during this period.

Of the ninety divisions with which the United States Army fought World War II, the all-draftee 88th Infantry Division -- the Blue Devil Division -- was the forty-ninth activated. Activation to embarkation for combat duty in Europe took the Blue Devils only sixteen months, a record in 1943 that was virtually unmatched in World War II.The draftee division's readiness was not proven by speed of training, however, it was proven in combat. At 2300 hours (11:00 PM), 11 May 1944, the Blue Devils, along with fifteen other Allied divisions, hurled themselves against the Nazis' vaunted Gustav line. On 4 June, elements of the 88th were the first of the Allied forces to enter Rome.Once again, the American citizen-soldier had shown himself to be more than a match in combat for his enemies.