This edited collection addresses a number of free speech vs security concerns that are engaged by counter-terrorism law and policy makers across a number of liberal democracies, and explores the delicate balance between free speech and the censoring of views that promote hatred or clash with fundamental democratic values. It does this by looking at the perspectives and level of disagreement between those who consider today’s counter-terrorism and extremism strategies to be a soft and liberal approach, and those who believe these strategies disproportionately impact freedom of expression and association and non-violent political dissent. The contributors include academics, practicing lawyers, and think-tank analysts who examine whether universities and schools incubators of violent radicalism and debate, and whether the views of ‘extremist’ speakers and hate preachers need to be censored. Outside the UK, critical discussion of the regulation of counter-terrorism, extremism, and free speech in other liberal democracies is also offered. This book will be of great interest to researchers and practitioners with interests in extremism, terrorism, civil rights, and freedom of speech.

As nations have aggressively implemented a wide range of mechanisms to proactively curb potential threats terrorism, Counter-Terrorism Laws and Freedom of Expression: Global Perspectives offers critical insight into how counter-terrorism laws have adversely affected journalism practice, digital citizenship, privacy, online activism, and other forms of expression. While governments assert the need for such laws to protect national security, critics argue counter-terrorism laws are prone to be misappropriated by state actors who use such laws to quash political dissent, target journalists, and restrict other forms of citizen expression. The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the politics and discourse of counter-terrorism laws. Part II focuses on the ways counter-terrorism laws have impacted journalistic practice in different countries, with effects ranging from imprisonment of reporters to self-censorship. Part III addresses how counter-terrorism laws have been used to target everyday citizens, social media activists, whistleblowers, and human rights advocates around the world. Together, the chapters address how counter-terrorism laws have undermined democratic values in both authoritarian and liberal political contexts. Scholars of political science, communication, and legal studies will find this book particularly interesting.

This international work provides information on and analysis of anti-terrorism law and policy by top experts in the field.

Preventing acts of terrorism remains one of the major tasks of domestic governments and regional and international organisations. Terrorism transcends borders, so anti-terrorism law must cross the boundaries of domestic, regional and international law. It also crosses traditional disciplinary boundaries between administrative, constitutional, criminal, financial, immigration, international and military law, as well as the law of war. This second edition provides a comprehensive resource on how domestic, regional and international responses to terrorism have developed since 2001. Chapters that focus on a particular country or region in the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia are complemented by overarching thematic chapters that take a comparative approach to particular aspects of anti-terrorism law and policy.

Although there has been a lot written about how counter-terrorism laws impact on human rights and civil liberties, most of this work has focussed on the most obvious or egregious kinds of human rights abrogation, such as extended detention, torture, and extraordinary rendition. Far less has been written about the complex ways in which Western governments have placed new and far-reaching limitations on freedom of speech in this context since 9/11. This book compares three liberal democracies - the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, in particular showing the commonalities and similarities in what has occurred in each country, and the changes in the appropriate parameters of freedom of speech in the counter-terrorism context since 9/11, achieved both in policy change and the justification for that change. In all three countries much speech has been criminalized in ways that were considered anachronistic, or inappropriate, in comparable policy areas prior to 9/11. This is particularly interesting because other works have suggested that the United States' unique protection of freedom of speech in the First Amendment has prevented speech being limited in that country in ways that have been pursued in others. This book shows that this kind of argument misses the detail of the policy change that has occurred, and privileges a textual reading over a more comprehensive policy-based understanding of the changes that have occurred. The author argues that we are now living a new-normal for freedom of speech, within which restrictions on speech that once would have been considered aberrant, overreaching, and impermissible are now considered ordinary, necessary, and justified as long as they occur in the counter-terrorism context. This change is persistent, and it has far reaching implications for the future of this foundational freedom.

Recent acts of terrorism and hate crimes have prompted a renewed focus on the possible links between internet content and offline violence. While some have focused on the role that social media companies play in moderating user-generated content, others have called for Congress to pass laws regulating online content promoting terrorism or violence. Proposals related to government action of this nature raise significant free speech questions, including (1) the reach of the First Amendment's protections when it comes to foreign nationals posting online content from abroad; (2) the scope of so-called "unprotected" categories of speech developed long before the advent of the internet; and (3) the judicial standards that limit how the government can craft or enforce laws to preserve national security and prevent violence. At the outset, it is not clear that a foreign national could invoke the protections of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has never directly opined on this question. However, its decisions regarding the extraterritorial application of other constitutional protections to foreign nationals and lower court decisions involving speech made by foreign nationals while outside of the United States suggest that the First Amendment may not apply in that scenario. In contrast, free speech considerations are likely to be highly relevant in evaluating the legality of (1) proposals for the U.S. government to regulate what internet users in the United States can post, or (2) the enforcement of existing U.S. laws where the government seeks to hold U.S. persons liable for their online speech. Although the government typically can regulate conduct without running afoul of the First Amendment, regulations that restrict or burden expression often do implicate free speech protections. In such circumstances, courts generally distinguish between laws that regulate speech on the basis of its content and those that do not, subjecting the former to more stringent review. A law that expressly restricts online communications or media promoting violence or terrorism is likely to be deemed a content-based restriction on speech; whereas a law that primarily regulates conduct could be subject to a less stringent standard of review, unless its application to speech turns on the message expressed. Whether such laws would survive First Amendment scrutiny depends on a number of factors. Over the past 50 years, the Supreme Court has generally extended the First Amendment's free speech protections to speech that advocates violence in the abstract while allowing the government to restrict or punish speech that threatens or facilitates violence in a more specific or immediate way. The subtle distinctions that have developed over time are reflected in the categories of speech that the court has deemed unprotected, meaning that the government generally can prohibit speech in these areas because of its content. These include incitement to imminent lawless action, true threats, and speech integral to criminal conduct. Although judicial decisions have helped to define the scope of some of these categories, open questions remain as to how they apply in the context of online speech. For instance, legal scholars have questioned what it means for speech to incite "imminent" violence when posted to social media. They have also asked how threats should be perceived when made in the context of online forums where hyperbolic speech about violence is common. The extent to which the government can regulate speech promoting violence or terrorism also depends on whether its law or action satisfies the applicable level of scrutiny that the Court has developed to evaluate measures that restrict or burden speech. In general, laws that regulate protected speech on political or ideological matters are subject to strict scrutiny, but in some cases, courts have concluded that the government's national security interests justify restrictions.

This book provides a systematic overview of counter-terrorism laws in twenty-two jurisdictions representing the Americas, Asia, Africa, Europe, and Australia.