This is a thoroughly revised second edition of a book that we published in 2010. Exporting Security is about the US military's role in military-to-military partnerships, such as helping to support and train foreign militaries, and about the US military's role in missions other than war, ranging from diplomacy, to development, to humanitarian assistance after disasters or during epidemics. Reveron is a proponent of these non-warfighting missions because he views them as an economical way to promote human security and regional security in trouble spots, which he says is in the US national interest. He also sees these efforts as making it less likely that the US will feel compelled to intervene directly in hot spots around the globe if our partners can maintain their own security or if humanitarian disasters can be averted. This second edition will take into account the Obama administration's foreign policy, the poor legacy of training the Iraqi army, the implications of more assertive foreign policies by Russia and China, and the US military's role in recent humanitarian crises such as the Ebola epidemic in West Africa--

In this thoroughly updated second edition, Derek S. Reveron provides a comprehensive analysis of the shift in US foreign policy from coercive diplomacy to cooperative military engagement. The US military does much more than fight wars; it responds to humanitarian crises and natural disasters, assists advanced militaries to support international peace, and trains and equips almost every military in the world. Rather than intervening directly, the United States can respond to crises by sending weapons, trainers, and advisers to assist other countries in tackling their own security deficits created by subnational, transnational, and regional challengers. By doing so, the United States seeks to promote partnerships and its soft power, strengthen the state sovereignty system, prevent localized violence from escalating into regional crises, and protect its national security by addressing underlying conditions that lead to war. Since coalition warfare is the norm, security cooperation also ensures partners are interoperable with US forces when the US leads international military coalitions. Exporting Security takes into account the Obama administration's foreign policy, the implications of more assertive foreign policies by Russia and China, and the US military's role in recent humanitarian crises and nation-building efforts.

In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology—and ignore the security risk—in a desperate search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In Exporting the Bomb, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

This is the first book to focus on the theoretical and practical issues of export control. It combines the points of view of Japanese and French academics and practitioners, including personnel at several governmental institutions and private companies. Presenting the results of a collaboration between Japanese and French academics, it contributes to the development of a new debate on export control. Although export control has been discussed within the framework of international law in terms of peace and security, its scope has now been expanded to international economic law (i.e., WTO law and international investment law). This means that in order to discuss export control appropriately, the two areas of law have to be combined. At the same time, this topic is not only academic and theoretical but touches upon very real and practical aspects of trade, export, and foreign investment. When we tighten embargos and economic sanctions for anti-terrorism or anti-nuclearization purposes, we encounter more and more cases of conflict between security and the liberalization of economic relations in the world. For this reason, a wide range of collaborative work is needed in this area. This timely book addresses various aspects of the current export control debate.

The first historical study of export control regulations as a tool for the sharing and withholding of knowledge. In this groundbreaking book, Mario Daniels and John Krige set out to show the enormous political relevance that export control regulations have had for American debates about national security, foreign policy, and trade policy since 1945. Indeed, they argue that from the 1940s to today the issue of how to control the transnational movement of information has been central to the thinking and actions of the guardians of the American national security state. The expansion of control over knowledge and know-how is apparent from the increasingly systematic inclusion of universities and research institutions into a system that in the 1950s and 1960s mainly targeted business activities. As this book vividly reveals, classification was not the only—and not even the most important—regulatory instrument that came into being in the postwar era.