This paper examines the relationship between governance variables and voluntary intellectual capital disclosure in a sample of European biotechnology firms. We extend previous research by simultaneously considering governance mechanisms such as the proportion of independent directors, board dimension, CEO duality, and board structure in relationship to voluntary disclosure on intellectual capital. We understand voluntary disclosure as a multidimensional and complex concept and, hence, use the semantic properties of the information disclosed, and on the content of information, as proxies for the quality of disclosure.Our results suggest that governance-related variables strongly influence the quantity of information disclosed, thus confirming our hypotheses. In regard to the quality of disclosure, our results show that (1) the proportion of independent directors is positively related to the disclosure of internal structure, (2) CEO duality is negatively linked to the disclosure of forward-looking information, and (3) board structure helps to improve the annual report's overall readability. We contribute to agency theory by indicating that corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure can be used strategically to reduce agency conflicts. The results of this study might be of interest to regulators, investment analysts, and market participants.

In this knowledge economy, there is a gradual shift in focus from capital and labor intensive firms to knowledge intensive firms. This paper focuses on the corporate governance and disclosure practices of firms listed on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The sample firms represent different sectors of Intellectual Capital (IC) intensive firms segregated according to types of IC (viz., human capital, structural capital and relational capital). These sectors are characterized by large investment in intangible or knowledge assets with relatively small proportion of tangible assets in their asset base. This research calculates IC intensity ratio for sample firms, and studies its impact on the corporate governance and disclosure practices of firms. By analysing the key characteristics of these IC intensive industries and subsequently studying the impact of the nature of industry (i.e. IC intensive firms) and types of IC on the corporate governance and disclosure practices, this research identifies and tests the empirical evidence for such relationship.

This e-book explores corporate disclosure of intellectual capital (IC) in light of emerging changes in technology and communication. Arguably, the annual report has long outlived itself as the best source of corporate disclosure because it contains backward looking information and is only a one-way means of presenting information rather than engaging with information users. Similarly, the stand-alone IC report is now rarely used to disclose IC information. In fact, the words "reporting" and "disclosure" are often used synonymously when they have different meanings. Disclosure is: "the revelation of information that was previously secret or unknown", while reporting is a "detailed periodic account of a company's activities, financial condition, and prospects that is made available to shareholders and investors" (Dumay, 2016, p. 178). Thus, investors and stakeholders value IC disclosures, not reports. Therefore, this e-book encourages emerging innovations for voluntary IC disclosure, to open up new possibilities for presenting previously secret or unknown IC information about today's dynamic and intangible based organizations.

The increasingly crucial role of companies’ non-financial disclosure (NFD) and integrated reporting (IR) has led to a lively debate among academics, practitioners, and regulators on the approaches, framework, contents, principles, and standards that should oversee these forms of reporting. Through several expert contributions, conducted both with qualitative and quantitative methodologies, this book provides an up-to-date portrait of the debate by exploring corporate NFD either in its mandated contents or voluntary information. Contributing authors provide studies that encompass the different lines of NFD, namely non-financial risk reporting, sustainability reporting, and intellectual capital reporting, as well as the integration of financial and non-financial information through IR, the assurance of the NFD and IR through auditing activities, and the role of management and CFOs in NFD and IR.

The results showed that reporting IC is negatively associated with the extent of external financing, while firms with high market-to-book values also disclose less IC information. However, contrary to expectations, the acquisition variable was insignificant although as expected, the relation between human capital disclosure and foreign operations was found to be positive and significant. For proprietary costs variables, there was a significantly positive relation between entry barriers and IC disclosure, and a negative relationship between IC and the intensity of industry competition. Finally, there was a significant, positive relationship between corporate governance and the disclosure of all types of IC.