This book explains both the strategic and the operational aspects of exercising control of the sea. The struggle for sea control consists of three mutually related and overlapping phases: obtaining, maintaining and exercising sea control. It is in the phase of exercising sea control when one’s strategic or operational success is exploited; otherwise, the fruits of victories achieved would be wasted. This work describes the strategy of a stronger side in wartime after a desired degree of control has been obtained, which is followed by a discussion on the objectives and main methods used in exercising sea control. The remaining chapters explain and analyze in some detail each of the main methods of exercising sea control: defence and protection of one’s own and destruction/neutralization of the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, capturing the enemy’s operationally important positions ashore, destroying/weakening the enemy’s military-economic potential ashore and supporting one’s ground forces in their offensive and defensive operations on the coast. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, sea power and naval history.

This book focuses on the key naval strategic objectives of obtaining and maintaining sea control. During times of war, sea control, or the ability of combatants to enjoy naval dominance, plays a crucial role in that side’s ability to attain overall victory. This book explains and analyzes in much greater detail sea control in all its complexities, and describes the main methods of obtaining and maintaining it. Building on the views of naval classical thinkers, this book utilizes historical examples to illustrate the main methods of sea control. Each chapter focuses on a particular method, including destroying the enemy forces by a decisive action, destroying enemy forces over time-attrition, containing enemy fleet, choke point control, and capturing important enemy's positions/basing area, The aim is to provide a comprehensive theory and practice of the struggle for sea control at the operational level. It should therefore provide a guide to practitioners on how to plan and conduct operational warfare at sea. The book will be of much interest to students of naval strategy, defence studies and security studies.

The Pacific Theater in World War II depended on American sea power. This power was refined between 1923 and 1940, when the U.S. Navy held twenty-one major fleet exercises designed to develop strategy and allow officers to enact plans in an operational setting. Prior to 1923, naval officers relied heavily on the theories of Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued that sea control was vital to military victory, best attained through use of the battleship. Fleet exercises, however, allowed valuable practice with other military resources and theories. As a direct result of these exercises, the navy incorporated different technologies and updated its own outdated strategies. Although World War II brought unforeseen challenges and the disadvantages of simulation exercises quickly became apparent, fleet "problems" may have opened the door to different ideas that allowed the U.S Navy ultimately to succeed. Testing American Sea Power challenges the conventional wisdom that Mahanian theory held the American Navy in a steel grip. Felker's research and analysis, the first to concentrate on the navy's interwar exercises, will make a valuable contribution to naval history for historians, military professionals, and naval instructors.

Many books and articles have been written on wars in narrow seas. However, none deals in any comprehensive manner with the problems of strategy and conduct of naval operations. The aim of this book is to explain in some detail the characteristics of a war fought in narrow seas and to compare and contrast strategy and major operations in narrow seas and naval warfare in the open ocean..

The principal aim of this book is to address the international legal questions arising from the 'right of visit on the high seas' in the twenty-first century. This right is considered the most significant exception to the fundamental principle of the freedom of the high seas (the freedom, in peacetime, to remain free of interference by ships of another flag). It is this freedom that has been challenged by a recent significant increase in interceptions to counter the threats of international terrorism and WMD proliferation, or to suppress transnational organised crime at sea, particularly the trafficking of narcotics and smuggling of migrants. The author questions whether the principle of non-interference has been so significantly curtailed as to have lost its relevance in the contemporary legal order of the oceans. The book begins with an historical and theoretical examination of the framework underlying interception. This historical survey informs the remainder of the work, which then looks at the legal framework of the right of visit, contemporary challenges to the traditional right, interference on the high seas for the maintenance of international peace and security, interferences to maintain the 'bon usage' of the oceans (navigation and fishing), piracy j'ure gentium'and current counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, the problems posed by illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, interdiction operations to counter drug and people trafficking, and recent interception operations in the Mediterranean Sea organised by FRONTEX.

Hal M. Friedman analyzes the major issues concerning the Pacific Basin that confronted the executive branch departments between 1945 and 1947.