This book will be of interest to all decision-makers and analysts concerned with supply contracts. The primary focus of this study is on one particular type of supply contract, namely, the exclusive dealing contract. Its essence is the agreement by a seller (or a lessor) and/or buyer (or lessee) to transact only with the other party for the duration of the contract. This analysis attempts to discern the economic reasons why that type of supply contract was utilized in individual cases, and to aggregate the results in a systematic fashion. It covers all the federal antitrust cases involving exclusive dealing that reached the Court of Appeals level and/or the Supreme Court through 1986. For the interested reader, careful referencing and an extensive bibliography provide easy access to treatments that are more theoretically disposed.

The most controversial area in competition policy is that of exclusionary practices, where actions are taken by dominant firms to deter competitors from challenging their market positions. Economists have been struggling to explain such conduct and to guide policy-makers in designing sensible enforcement rules. In this book, authors Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta, and Claudio Calcagno explore predatory pricing, rebates, exclusive dealing, tying, and vertical foreclosure, through a blend of theory and practice. They develop a general framework which builds on and extends existing economic theories, drawing upon case law, discussions of cases and other practical considerations to identify workable criteria that can guide competition authorities to assess exclusionary practices. Along with analyses of policy implications and insights applied to case studies, the book provides practitioners with non-technical discussions of the issues at hand, while guiding economics students with dedicated technical sections with rigorous formal models.

This book examines the treatment of fdelity rebates as one of the most controversial topics in EU competition law. The controversy arose from the lack of clarity as to how to distinguish between rebates that constitute a legitimate business practice and those that might have anticompetitive e?ects, as the same type of rebates could be pro-competitive or anticompetitive depending on their e?ects on competition. This book clarifes the appropriate treatment of fdelity rebates under EU competition law by o?ering original insights on the way in which abusive rebates should be identifed, taking into account the wealth of EU case law in this area, the economics' literature and the perspective of US antitrust law. The critical discussion on the case law is centred on the idea as to whether the as efcient competitor (AEC) test is an important part of the assessment of fdelity rebates and in which circumstances it could be used as one tool among others. The analysis treats such issues and topics as the following: – What motivated the EU Courts to treat fdelity rebates as illegal ‘by object'? – Why has this case law drawn so much criticism from academics and other commentators? – What can we learn from the economic theories of exclusive dealing and fdelity rebates, and whether the strict approach of the Courts can be supported by economic empirical studies? – What is the meaning attached to the notion of an ‘e?ects-based' approach as an expression of the reform of Article 102? – Why is the controversy regarding the treatment of fdelity rebates still a live issue after the Intel and the Post Danmark II judgments? – In which circumstances the price-cost test can be used as a reliable tool to distinguish between anticompetitive and pro-competitive fdelity rebates? – Can we evaluate the e?ect of fdelity rebates without necessarily carrying out a price-cost test? – Can we consider the AEC test as a single unifying test for all types of exclusionary abuses? – What can we learn about the application of the AEC test in fdelity rebate cases from the recent US case law? A concluding chapter provides an original perspective and also policy recommendations on how the abusive character of fdelity rebates should be assessed including an appropriate legal test that is administrable, creates predictability and legal certainty and minimises the risk of errors and the cost of those mistakes. This book takes a giant step towards improving the understanding of the legal treatment of fdelity rebates and understanding as to whether the treatment of fdelity rebates could be e?ects-based, without necessarily carrying out an AEC test. It will also contribute signifcantly to the practical work of enforcement agencies, courts and private entities and their advisors. book's parallel study of US and EU competition law.

Preface p. xi 1 Economics p. 1 I. Definitions p. 1 II. Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly p. 9 III. Further Topics p. 21 2 Law and Policy p. 27 I. Some Interpretation Issues p. 28 II. Enacting the Antitrust Law p. 30 III. What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? p. 40 3 Enforcement p. 43 I. Optimal Enforcement Theory p. 43 II. Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws p. 47 Appendix p. 64 4 Cartels p. 68 I. Cartels p. 68 II. Conscious Parallelism p. 73 III. Conclusion p. 89 5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine p. 90 I. The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law p. 90 II. Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 104 III. Conclusion p. 112 6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule p. 113 I. The Case for Price Fixing p. 113 II. Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments p. 116 III. Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule p. 129 7 Agreement p. 132 I. The Development of Inference Doctrine p. 133 II. Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory p. 140 8 Facilitating Mechanisms p. 144 I. Data Dissemination Cases p. 145 II. Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices p. 154 III. Basing Point Pricing: Economics p. 160 9 Boycotts p. 166 I. Pre-Socony p. 166 II. Post-Socony p. 170 III. Post-BMI/Sylvania p. 181 IV. Conclusion p. 184 10 Monopolization p. 186 I. Development of Section 2 Doctrine p. 186 II. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases p. 202 III. Predatory Pricing p. 212 IV. Conclusion p. 228 11 Power p. 230 I. Measuring Market Power p. 230 II. Determinants of Market Power p. 235 III. Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane p. 237 IV. Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa p. 239 V. Measuring Power: Guidelines p. 243 12 Attempts p. 244 I. The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine p. 244 II. Dangerous Probability Requirement p. 248 13 Vertical Restraints p. 252 I. Resale Price Maintenance p. 252 II. Vertical Nonprice Restraints p. 262 III. Manufacturer Retains Title p. 267 IV. Agreement p. 270 14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing p. 279 I. Introduction p. 279 II. Early Cases p. 284 III. Development of Per-Se Rule p. 286 IV. Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule p. 295 V. Technological Tying p. 301 VI. Exclusive Dealing p. 303 Appendix p. 307 15 Horizontal Mergers p. 311 I. Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law p. 311 II. Horizontal Merger Law p. 317 III. Conclusion p. 330 Appendix p. 330 16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate p. 333 I. Vertical Mergers p. 333 II. Conglomerate Mergers p. 344 III. Concluding Remarks p. 351 17 Antitrust and the State p. 352 I. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine p. 354 II. Parker Doctrine p. 371 III. Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines p. 375 Index p. 379.

This is Volume 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Volumes 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 and many of the chapters were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve and this volume fills the gaps. While the first two volumes of HIO contain much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature, it was representative of the field at that time. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis.Thie volume is an excellent reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies.*Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series*Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields*A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists

The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.