Examining US-China-Russia Foreign Relations explores the changing nature and function of the US–China–Russia strategic triangle from the end of the Cold War up to the present. Gregory Hall uses neoclassical realist international relations (IR) theory to argue that, since the mid-2000s, the politics of the strategic triangle have been increasingly influenced by factors related to the Big3 countries’ respective domestic environments. Hall utilizes agency and context for each of the three great powers, expanding on previously established frameworks to include a comparative analysis of each actor’s domestic environment for foreign policy and the interplay between the domestic and external contexts. In IR terms, the book identifies and illustrates how factors including systemic, state and societal, individuals, and small groups influence the foreign relations of the Big3. Hall concludes by exploring the future prospects for great power relations and for global affairs. Incorporating both theoretical and empirical data to offer a fresh and timely look at the myriad challenges facing the three powers, this book provides an excellent companion to students of foreign policy, international security, and post-Cold War international politics.

Introduction: the guns of August -- Contours of Russian foreign policy -- Bulldogs fighting under the rug: the making of Russian foreign policy -- Resetting expectations: Russia and the United States -- Europe: between integration and confrontation -- Rising China and Russia's Asian vector -- Playing with home field advantage? Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors -- Conclusion: dealing with Russia's foreign policy reawakening.

Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis argue that the United States has responded inadequately to the rise of Chinese power. This Council Special Report recommends placing less strategic emphasis on the goal of integrating China into the international system and more on balancing China's rise.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

This book surveys Russia's relations with the world since 1992 and assesses the future prospect for the foreign policy of Europe's largest country. Together these essays offer an authoritative summary and assessment of Russia's relations with its neighbors and with the rest of the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A look at how the desire to improve international status affects Russia's and China's foreign policies Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko argue that the desire for world status plays a key role in shaping the foreign policies of China and Russia. Applying social identity theory—the idea that individuals derive part of their identity from larger communities—to nations, they contend that China and Russia have used various modes of emulation, competition, and creativity to gain recognition from other countries and thus validate their respective identities. To make this argument, they analyze numerous cases, including Catherine the Great’s attempts to westernize Russia, China’s identity crises in the nineteenth century, and both countries’ responses to the end of the Cold War. The authors employ a multifaceted method of measuring status, factoring in influence and inclusion in multinational organizations, military clout, and cultural sway, among other considerations. Combined with historical precedent, this socio-psychological approach helps explain current trends in Russian and Chinese foreign policy.

This book analyses international relations between the USA, China, and Russia and provides an overview of how the US-China-Russia triangle has evolved over time. Based on a forensic examination of primary documentation from US archives, the author illustrates how the US strategic perspectives on Chinese–Russian relations have developed since the late-19th century. The author demonstrates how US relations with the Russian and Chinese empires began expanding into greater sophistication and complexity in the 19th century, reflecting changing US concerns, priorities, and preferences vis-à-vis Sino-Russian dynamics which themselves, too, were evolving in parallel and, in some instances, in an interactive fashion. The book analyses US perceptions of Sino-Russian interactions in ways which, from the US perspective, affected US interests, either positively or negatively.