Evidential Decision Theory is a radical theory of rational decision-making. It recommends that instead of thinking about what your decisions *cause*, you should think about what they *reveal*. This Element explains in simple terms why thinking in this way makes a big difference, and argues that doing so makes for *better* decisions. An appendix gives an intuitive explanation of the measure-theoretic foundations of Evidential Decision Theory.

The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true.

A comprehensive and accessible introduction to all aspects of decision theory, now with new and updated discussions and over 140 exercises.

Explores how decision-makers can manage uncertainty that varies in both kind and severity by extending and supplementing Bayesian decision theory.

A distinguished group of philosophers, decision theorists, and psychologists offer new interdisciplinary perspectives on the rationality of self-control.

Newcomb's problem is a controversial paradox of decision theory. It is easily explained and easily understood, and there is a strong chance that most of us have actually faced it in some form or other. And yet it has proven as thorny and intractable a puzzle as much older and better-known philosophical problems of consciousness, scepticism and fatalism. It brings into very sharp and focused disagreement several long-standing philosophical theories on practical rationality, on the nature of free will, and on the direction and analysis of causation. This volume introduces readers to the nature of Newcomb's problem, and ten chapters by leading scholars present the most recent debates around the problem and analyse its ramifications for decision theory, metaphysics, philosophical psychology and political science. Their chapters highlight the status of Newcomb's problem as a live and continuing issue in modern philosophy.

Kaplan presents an accessible new variant on Bayesian decision theory.