In September 2006 the EU and Cabo Verde concluded a bilateral Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA). This Agreement provided fishing possibilities exclusively for highly migratory species for EU vessels fishing in Cabo Verde waters. It entered into force on 30 March 2007 and has been automatically renewed twice for periods of 5 years (29 March 2012 and 29 March 2017). The current Protocol was signed, and entered into provisional application on 23 December 2014, it will expire on 22 December 2018. The Protocol sets out the fishing opportunities and financial contributions provided for in the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA). It grants to the EU fishing opportunities for up to 71 vessels to fish for tuna and other highly migratory species in 3 fishing categories: 28 tuna seiners, 30 surface long liners and 13 pole-and-line vessels, with a reference tonnage of 5,000 t/year. The Member States interested in fisheries activities in the EEZ of Cabo Verde are, France (FR), Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES). The annual EU public financial contribution to Cabo Verde amounts to EUR 550,000/ year out of which EUR 275,000 is earmarked for the support of the Cabo Verde fisheries policy for the first two years of the Protocol, and EUR 250,000/ year for the last two years of the Protocol. The Agreement is classified by the EU as a "tuna agreement" (as opposed to multi-species agreements); its main characteristics are provided in Table 1. The SFPA with Cabo Verde is part of a network of SFPAs with other coastal States in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean, which include Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and São Tomé and Príncipe (tuna agreements) and Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Morocco (multi-species agreements). The present report provides an independent ex-post evaluation study of the current four-year Protocol to the SFPA between the EU and the Republic of Cabo Verde as well as an ex-ante evaluation of a future Protocol. This final report presents information collected from various sources, including the EU/DG MARE, EU concerned Member states (FR, PT, ES) and the professional associations of EU vessel operators concerned with the availability and utilisation of fishing possibilities. It also includes the findings of a mission to Cabo Verde that took place in December 2017, during which discussions were held in Praia and Mindelo with Cabo Verdean and other stakeholders involved in the implementation of the SFPA, including public authorities, private sector and NGOs.

The first fisheries agreement between the European Community and Angola was signed in 1989 and denounced in 2006 by the EU, due to the legislative framework adopted in Angola in 2004. EU vessels currently fishing in the Angolan exclusive economic zone (EEZ) do so on the basis of direct authorisations. Since 2019, Angola has showed interest in a sustainable fisheries partnership agreement (SFPA), and both the EU and Angola have agreed to initiate exploratory discussions about a SFPA. This ex-ante evaluation was carried out in accordance with both the EU Financial Regulation and its Rules of Application and the European Commission's Better Regulation Guidelines and 'Toolbox'. A wide range of stakeholders in both the EU and Angola were consulted, the former largely using questionnaires with responses provided by email, and the latter through a field mission to Angola. A large body of relevant secondary data was also reviewed.

This book examines how the EU and international law frameworks impact the EU’s ability to act normatively in its external action in the area of fisheries. The EU, a major fishing power, portrays itself as a normative actor and a champion of sustainable fishing. The volume reconceptualises the Normative Power Europe narrative by identifying three interrelated elements – universality, use of instruments, and legitimacy – as the key criteria against which to evaluate the normativity of the EU’s conduct. The universality element examines the level of international acceptance of the stated aims of EU action; the use of instruments element examines the EU’s participation limitations in relevant international institutions and the means (persuasion as opposed to coercion) through which it acts; and the legitimacy element examines the substance of the EU’s action in terms of legality, protection of common or self-interests, and coherence and consistency. The book draws upon extensive research into both the international and EU legal frameworks relating to fisheries and the EU’s practice in its external fisheries relations. It consecutively discusses four sets of challenges: (i) to the EU’s normativity posed by lack of membership in global institutions; (ii) created notwithstanding membership in other global or regional bodies; (iii) connected to multileveled coercive action and (iv) to accessing foreign fishing resources. It claims that, while the EU’s normativity depends greatly on its internal and external powers, it is the EU’s inability to freely wield these powers that damages its normativity. To act normatively, the EU primarily needs the full Member States’ support, as its present constitution prevents it from acting completely independently from them. The volume is aimed at academics and practitioners alike working in the area of fisheries globally but also on the EU’s external action more generally. Mihail Vatsov is Programme Manager with the European Commission in Brussels, Belgium.