The Russia-Europe relationship is deteriorating, signaling the darkest era yet in security on the continent since the end of the Cold War. In addition, the growing influence of the Trump administration has destabilized the transatlantic security community, compelling Europe—especially the European Union—to rethink its relations with Russia. The volume editors’ primary goal is to illuminate the nature of the deteriorating security relationship between Europe and Russia, and the key implications for its future. While the book is timely, the editors and contributors also draw out long-term lessons from this era of diplomatic degeneration to show how increasing cooperation between two regions can devolve into rapidly escalating conflict. While it is possible that the relationship between Russia and Europe can ultimately be restored, it is also necessary to understand why it was undermined in the first place. The fact that these transformations occur under the backdrop of an uncertain transatlantic relationship makes this investigation all the more pressing. Each chapter in this volume addresses three dimensions of the problem: first, how and why the power status quo that had existed since the end of the Cold War has changed in recent years, as evidenced by Russia’s newly aggressive posturing; second, the extent to which the EU’s power has been enabled or constrained in light of Russia’s actions; and third, the risks entailed in Europe’s reactive power—that is, the tendency to act after-the-fact instead of proactively toward Russia—in light of the transatlantic divide under Trump.

There has never been a more important time to understand Russia's relationship with Europe and it is the subsequent sense of unease both in Russia and Europe which provides the focus for this investigation and which will make it of use to specialist and general readers alike.

More than 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and two decades after the last Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, raised hopes that Russia would liberalize and join a common European home, Moscow again resorts to authoritarian means amid the continuing absence of a mutual agenda for Russia's integration into Western institutions. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and the West have averted renewed confrontation but managed only to craft a series of half-formed, suboptimal partnerships-with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Group of 71-in which Russia is neither anchored by democratic rules nor fully excluded by Western institutions. These "special relationships," which have been often turbulent, are now seriously strained by Russia's stronger geopolitical position, boosted by sustained high economic growth and market power in energy, and newly-emboldened rulers, who seek to renegotiate terms. Why did "special relationships" materialize between Russia and the dominant Euro-Atlantic institutions instead of a Concert of Europe, a Cold Peace, full integration into Western institutions, direct confrontation, or a different outcome? How durable is the present, second best equilibrium? Which factors would increase the prospects for a mutually-beneficial agenda for integration? What are the risks that a more authoritarian and nationalist Russia will grow defiant and revanchist over its unfavorable terms of engagement, leading not to closer cooperation but a reemergence of two Europes, one led by the EU and NATO as the core and the other centered on Russia, relegated to the periphery and tempted to act as a spoiler and a closer ally of rogue regimes in Eurasia and elsewhere? This monograph, which focuses on Russia and the EU, explains why such special relationships tend to produce shallow collaboration, symbolic summitry, and costly standoffs. It underscores the bargaining problems which block closer cooperation in areas of mutual interest, from managing energy interdependence, instability in the Balkans, and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, to negotiating a new partnership and cooperation agreement. The ongoing disputes are over terms, not just enforcement, and rooted in asymmetries in power, uncertainty about the distributional costs and benefits of engagement, and mistrust generated by Russia's continued unwillingness or inability to lock-in the liberal domestic structures necessary to make credible commitments or converge to European norms. Domestic interests and political veto players further work against deep cooperation. Russia's autocrats and dominant elites who gain phenomenal wealth from their positions of power have a stake in a nontransparent, illiberal Russian state and eschew international agreements requiring strict conditionality and accountability. Russia even has shown its willingness to cut the flow of energy supplies to two key transit states, Ukraine and Belarus, over price disputes, notwithstanding the disruptions to its EU customers farther west. For its part, the EU often is unable to impose discipline on the national politics and domestic interests of 27 member states, making it easier for Moscow to cut myopic, bilateral deals such as the German-Russian energy cartel which is building a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and Poland, which depend heavily on Russia for energy. Warsaw, in turn, has been willing to use its EU veto to block the start of negotiations on a new EU-Russia partnership and cooperation treaty, underscoring political and economic disputes with Moscow. For both the Europeans and Russians, mistrust persists, and both sides are profoundly ambivalent about the desirability of deepening their relationship.

This book provides a detailed analysis of Russia’s ‘great power identity’ and the role of Europe in forming this identity. ‘Great power identity’ implies an expansionist foreign policy, and yet this does not explain all the complexities of the Russian state. For instance, it cannot explain why Russia decided to take over Crimea, but provided only limited support to break-away regions in Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, if Russia is in geo-economic competition with Europe, why has no serious conflict erupted between Moscow and other post-Soviet states which developed closer ties with the EU? Finally, why does Putin maintain relationships with the European countries that imposed tough economic sanctions on Russia? Vsevolod Samokhvalov provides a more nuanced understanding of Russia’s great power identity by drawing on his experience in regional diplomacy and research and applying a constructivist methodology. The book will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, in particular Russian-European relations, Russian foreign policy and Russian studies.

Kanet discusses Russia's return as a super power and examines the global implications.

In adapting themselves to the post-Cold War period, the EU and Russia have been faced with a range of challenges in relation to their separate political and economic development and their respective identities. Not the least problematic of those challenges, however, has been in deciding the nature and shape of their relationship with each other. In 2010, the Partnership for Modernisation was formed and it is this modernising agenda, as seen through theoretical, historical, economic and political perspectives, that is the focus of this book.