At the launch of the Euro, predictions about what has been dubbed "Euroland" were mixed. Supporters say the unprecedented switch to a single currency will benefit business and consumers alike. But critics warn that EMU is a giant leap into the unknown. The purpose of this book is to bring together the available evidence to date about EMU, focusing on European monetary and fiscal policy. Sylvester Eijffinger and Jakob de Haan have produced a fresh and forward-looking account of the issues surrounding monetary integration. Their analysis includes the functions and goals of the European Central Bank, the Treaty on European Union, the Stability and Growth Pact, and the harmonization of taxes. They go on to discuss the targets and instruments of European monetary policy, the relationships between the 'ins' and 'outs' within Europe, the integration of European financial markets, and the competition between financial institutions in Europe. Finally, the international role ofthe Euro and future of international policy co-ordination are investigated. The text has been presented for maximum clarity: each chapter concludes with a summary of the main issues, and case material and key topics are highlighted in boxes in order to help students focus on essential information. This thorough, innovative, and well-researched analysis has been carefully tailored to meet the course needs of undergraduate students of economic integration, European economics, international economics, and European studies.

Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

The contributors to this text, all economists and scholars, combine theoretical analysis and policy recommendation in their examination of the difficulties of European monetary integration.

The first twenty years of the European Central Bank offer a unique insight into how a central bank can navigate macroeconomic insecurity and crisis. This volume examines the structures and decision-making processes behind the complex measures taken by the ECB to tackle some of the toughest economic challenges in the history of modern Europe.

This book studies the formal creation and the gradual change of the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union (EMU). The book explains why and how the Pact was pushed through by Germany despite fierce opposition from the majority of member states. It provides a unique, in-depth analysis of how a new coalition of member states, including Germany, achieved a creeping reinterpretation of the rules which prepared the way for a formal reform of the Pact in 2005, ten years after its invention. Four case studies show why and how the margin of maneuver inherent in the Pact was used to accommodate the preferences of those governments which were in breach of the Pact, and explains how they managed to lower the costs of change. To analyze these formal and informal dynamics, the study develops a model of institutional change which focuses on the actors, their preferences, and the systemic intermediation of national preferences. This model is applicable to other policy fields in the multi-level EU system. By offering new insights into the conflict potential inherent in the interplay of national preferences and European fiscal rules, the book feeds into the recent debate on the necessity and feasibility of a political union in the evolving EMU.

This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

This book provides a much-needed detailed analysis of the evolution of Europe over the last decade, as well as a discussion about the path of reform that has been trodden in the aftermath of the financial crisis. It offers a multidisciplinary view of the E(M)U and captures the main factors that induced the reform of the monetary union – a process that has not been linear and is far from being concluded. The author examines the policy responses designed throughout the development of the crisis and assesses the scale of the crisis in Europe, in comparison to other parts of the world, as well as its prolonged effects both in economic and financial terms. An update on the current ‘state of the art’ in the conception of risk-sharing mechanisms is provided. With its innovative approach, the book analyses the financing issues which need to be taken into consideration in the design of these instruments and highlights the main categories of governmental risk-sharing mechanisms – in particular, the ones to be used as ‘fiscal capacity’. This is a timely and topical book and will be of interest to a broad audience, including experts, scholars and students of European affairs, particularly those with economic, financial, legal and political science backgrounds.