Most recently, Japan’s Defence Minister Kishi said the international community must be aware of a possible Crimea-style invasion of Taiwan by China. With the objective of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific, the six-nation naval exercise that took place near Okinawa and the South China Sea among Japan, the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, and New Zealand between 2 and 9 October for air defence, anti-submarine warfare, communications, and replenishment-at-sea must be understood against the background of this intense military environment.

In Europe's Evolving Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific: Nine Perspectives, a global cohort of experts and scholars analyze Europe's engagement in the Indo-Pacific and provide recommendations for Europe's deeper involvement in Asia via the economy, diplomatic affairs, and security contributions. Key topics in the book include sustainable prosperity, the Green Transition, ocean governance, digital governance, connectivity, as well as defense. Europe's Evolving Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific: Nine Perspectives features viewpoints from the European Union, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, India, ASEAN, Australia, Japan, and the United States.

This original book systematically examines Japan’s defense engagement with its strategic partners since the end of the Cold War based on Japan’s national security strategy. The author maps three defense engagement activities: military exercises, capacity building, and defense equipment transfer and technology cooperation – and subsequently evaluates these against the three national security objectives: deterrence, cooperative security, and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. The book asks two important research questions: why is Japan active in defense engagement with the armed forces of its strategic partners? And, what purposes do Japan’s self-defense forces pursue? Through the ten carefully selected cases of strategic partners: Australia, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, ASEAN, the UK, France, NATO, and the EU, the book follows a structured, cross-case comparison based on the analytical framework developed for the research. It also discusses the evolution of Japan’s postwar defense policy, providing a solid background for the case studies. The book overall argues that, while the Japan-US alliance is still the most indispensable, Japan’s strategic partnerships are a valuable instrument of deterrence that contributes to Japan’s national security objectives. In order to more effectively pursue these objectives and thus secure the national interest, Japan must pursue a purpose-driven defense engagement.

This edited volume provides state perspectives on Europe’s security engagement in the Indo-Pacific from four different sub-regions and twelve different countries in the Indo-Pacific, namely – East Asia (Japan, China and South Korea); Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore); Oceania (Australia, New Zealand and Fiji) and lastly South Asia (India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives). By engaging with diverse countries, the framing in the book also allows for the inclusion of established and emerging regional groupings, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).

Since a 2010 incident of Chinese fishing vessels colliding into the Japan Coast Guard’s ships, China’s activities around the Senkaku Islands and the broader East China Sea only grew more aggressive and more frequent. Facing increasing pressure from China in the East China Sea, Japan welcomes greater European engagement in the Indo-Pacific.In her paper, Yuki Tatsumi argues that Japan primarily considers Europe a diplomatic and strategic partner to help maintain a value-based liberal international order in the Indo-Pacific region.Japan hopes that greater activity in the region by European countries would raise the stakes for China if it continues its aggressive behavior in the region, thereby deterring Beijing in non-confrontational ways.

Key judgements 1. The Biden administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has so far lacked focus and urgency. Despite its deep regional expertise and the region’s high expectations, it has failed to articulate a comprehensive regional strategy or treat the Indo-Pacific as its decisive priority. 2. The Biden administration’s focus on bringing normalcy back to US regional policy has restored the status quo, but not advanced its standing in the Indo-Pacific. 3. The Biden administration’s approach to competition with China has focused on the domestic and global arenas, rather than on competing for influence within the Indo-Pacific. 4. The Biden administration’s focus on long-term systems competition with China overlooks the urgency of near-term competition in the Indo-Pacific. 5. The Biden administration has placed strategic competition with China at the top of its foreign and security policy agenda. It has sought to balance US-China rivalry with opportunities for cooperation and efforts to stabilise the regional order. 6. The Biden administration views its Indo-Pacific allies as regional and international “force multipliers.” It has largely trained these alliances on global order issues, with few new initiatives at the regional level and insufficient focus on empowering allies to meet their own security needs. 7. The Biden administration sees the United States as being in a “systems competition” between democracy and autocracy. By making ideological competition with China an organising principle for US foreign policy, Washington risks undermining its attractiveness as a partner for politically diverse Indo-Pacific countries. 8. The Biden administration cannot compete against China effectively in the Indo-Pacific without prioritising engagement with Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. It has recognised the need to do more in Southeast Asia, but its success may be limited by its approach to competition with China and lack of an economic strategy. 9. The Biden administration, like its predecessors, lacks an economic strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. This major weakness in regional policy is driven by US protectionist trade preferences at home. Proposed initiatives on digital trade and infrastructure cannot compensate for the absence of a comprehensive trade-based economic approach. 10. The Biden administration views China as a predominantly long-term military challenge. Its efforts to minimise spending on US forward posture in the region suggest it may be less committed to a strategy of deterrence by denial to prevent Chinese aggression. Recommendations for the Biden administration To compete for influence in the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration should: 1. Clearly identify the Indo-Pacific region as its foreign and defence policy priority and marshal resources accordingly. 2. Articulate clear goals for its relationship with China and its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific region. 3. Avoid emphasising ideological competition with China and instead focus on maximising its influence by responding to regional needs. 4. Signal its commitment to a strategy of deterrence by denial to prevent Chinese aggression and bolster its investments in Western Pacific military posture to reinforce its credibility. 5. Empower its allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defence requirements by reducing legislative and political obstacles to allied self-strengthening. 6. Pay special attention to Southeast Asia as a region of strategic importance, given its geography, size and the fluidity of its alignment dynamics. 7. Clearly signal that it is committed to mutually beneficial economic engagement with the Indo-Pacific and adopt trade and investment strategies that reinforce its role as an indispensable resident economic power.