This clear and systematic introduction to the philosophy of law attempts to answer some important questions about the nature of law and its relationship to social norms and moral standards.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.

This book examines an interesting and relatively understudied area of the evolution of the international rule of law and the role of professional ethics. The rule of law has been gradually developed and promoted at the national level over centuries, however at the international level it has only recently received (more in rhetoric than in implementation) support from a macro perspective - developments of international rules and institutions, and from a micro perspective - ethical codes, independence and un-bias of professionals, working in international organizations and tribunals. The book offers analysis and recommends policies to strengthen the rule of law at international level to meet a major global governance demand in ensuring equity, justice, stability and consistency in international affairs.

The rule of law neither celebrates human rights nor simply ratifies whatever happens to be on the statute books. At its core it simply guarantees that laws, however immoral or unjust, penalise people only for what they do, and never for what they are. Yet even when its moral accretions are stripped away, the rule of law offers protections that morality itself has trouble maintaining.This book draws on contemporary moral theory, philosophy of law and political theory to explore the rule of law. Offering new perspectives on contemporary moral issues, particularly those related to race relations, cultural diversity, and 'political correctness', Neumann argues that the rule of law does not compete with morality, but complements it, suggesting how, if we cannot find principles suitable to our societies, perhaps we can make societies that fit our principles.

Judges sometimes hear cases in which the law, as they honestly understand it, requires results that they consider morally objectionable. Most people assume that, nevertheless, judges have an ethical obligation to apply the law correctly, at least in reasonably just legal systems. This is the view of most lawyers, legal scholars, and private citizens, but the arguments for it have received surprisingly little attention from philosophers. Combiming ethical theory with discussions of caselaw, Jeffrey Brand-Ballard challenges arguments for the traditional view, including arguments from the fact that judges swear oaths to uphold the law, and arguments from our duty to obey the law, among others. He then develops an alternative argument based on ways in which the rule of law promotes the good. Patterns of excessive judicial lawlessness, even when morally motivated, can damage the rule of law. Brand-Ballard explores the conditions under which individual judges are morally responsible for participating in destructive patterns of lawless judging. These arguments build upon recent theories of collective intentionality and presuppose an agent-neutral framework, rather than the agent-relative framework favored by many moral philosophers. Defying the conventional wisdom, Brand-Ballard argues that judges are not always morally obligated to apply the law correctly. Although they have an obligation not to participate in patterns of excessive judicial lawlessness, an individual departure from the law so as to avoid an unjust result is rarely a moral mistake if the rule of law is otherwise healthy. Limits of Legality will interest philosophers, legal scholars, lawyers, and anyone concerned with the ethics of judging.