The Department for Transport has approved expenditure of over £11 billion between 1998 and 2021 for the development of new and existing trunk roads and motorways by the Highways Agency, and just under £1.7 billion on major road schemes proposed and developed by local authorities in five year Local Transport Plans. Following on from a NAO report on this topic (HCP 321, session 2006-07; ISBN 9780102944600) published in March 2007, the Committee's report examines the steps taken by the Department for Transport and the Highways Agency to improve value for money and oversight of the roads programme and contracting methods and project management capability. By September 2006, the Agency's 36 completed schemes in the Targeted Programme of Improvement cost 40 per cent more than estimated initially, and for schemes still to be completed, latest forecasts indicate that final costs could be 27 per cent more than original estimates. The main causes for costs exceeding estimates are increases in construction costs, higher than forecast land prices and compensation to landowners, inflation and changes in the scope of the project. The report finds that the DfT has not been rigorous enough in its oversight of the Agency's delivery of major road schemes, allowing it too much latitude on delivery and cost plans, and has failed to monitor in-year expenditure against progress and delivery milestones. The Agency is overly reliant on consultants for project management expertise and needs to develop its in-house capability.

This NAO report examines how the costs of building and improving roads are estimated and monitored from early forecasts through to the final cost of schemes. The Department for Transport has approved expenditure of over £11 billion between 1998 and 2021 for the development of new and existing trunk roads and motorways by the Highways Agency, and just under £1.7 billion on major road schemes proposed and developed by local authorities in five year Local Transport Plans. The report finds that robust estimating is a key factor in delivering value for money from road schemes but represents a difficult and challenging task given the timescale of major road projects and the number of potential variables, some of which are outside of the direct control of the Agency and local authorities, such as the outcomes of public inquiries and construction inflation. It recognises the work being undertaken to improve the Agency's estimating processes, and the Department's review of proposals put forward by local authorities. However, there is scope for further improvements, for example to improve the evaluation of completed schemes and examine costs against budget and the scheme's progress against timetable so that they have better information to prepare estimates, and improving how the Department and the Agency work together by better sharing of lessons learned with each other and local authorities.

'Privately Financed Roads in Britain: A Policy Assessment' critically examines the role of private finance in the construction, operation, maintenance and management of modern highways. The focus is on the UK's Private Finance Initiative (PFI) yet many of the lessons learned retain a currency in the context of international public-private partnerships. Separate chapters cover: Public Policy Objectives; Key Project-Level Risks (construction and traffic); Value for Money and Public Sector Comparators; The Financial Architecture of Private Sector Road Operating Companies; Strengths and Weaknesses of the Privately-Financed Roads Model; Alternative Debt/Equity Structuring; and Containing Private Financing Costs.

This report contains two independent reviews that are part of a series of reports the NAO will be producing into savings reported by departments as part of the targets set by the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review. The Department for Transport reported savings of £892 million, of which the NAO found that 43 per cent fairly represent realised cash savings, 22 per cent may represent realised cash savings but with some uncertainty, and 35 per cent may be overstated. At the Home Office, the NAO sampled £338 million of £544 million reported savings and found 59 per cent of these fairly represent realised cash savings, 24 per cent may represent realised cash savings but with some uncertainty, and the NAO has significant concerns over 17 per cent. Overall, the Government has set a target to generate annually cash-releasing savings of £35 billion by 2010-11. The savings programme is based on the principle that the planned savings have already been removed from departments' budgets. Departments therefore have to deliver savings to release enough cash to meet their spending plans or reduce activity compared with the planned level. The NAO is satisfied that, in many cases, both departments are achieving long term savings. The main reasons for the NAO's concerns are: Eighty per cent of the Department for Transport's reported savings relate to support for the rail industry. The NAO considers the benchmarks against which these savings were measured should have been revised in the light of the most recent information, which would reduce the savings reported in 2008-09. The main reasons for the NAO's concerns with around 17 per cent of savings reported by the Home Office were that reported gains were one-off cash savings which will not permanently reduce the Department's expenditure, or were not new annual savings as the procurement actions had been taken in prior years.

Incorporating HC 533, session 2008-09

Providing new knowledge on risk analysis and simulation for megaprojects, this book is essential reading for both academics and practitioners. Its focus is on technical descriptions of a newly developed dynamic systems approach to megaproject risk analysis and simulation.

Government invests in a range of large scientific facilities to support and develop the nation's science base, with over £860 million allocated since 2000 to construct 10 new large scientific projects. These programmes include: a Diamond Synchrotron (costing £383 million) to produce intense X-rays and shorter wavelength emissions for examining structures at molecular and atomic level; a new research ship, RRS James Cook, to conduct oceanographic and marine studies (a budget of £40 million); and a new Antarctic research station (with a budget of £34.7 million) for monitoring climate, ozone and space weather. Following on from a NAO report on this topic (HCP 153, session 2006-07, ISBN 9780102944198) published in January 2007, the Committee's report examines how large scientific facilities are delivered and the how their value is assessed. Findings include that the first two projects have been delivered largely to time and budget, but other projects still at an early stage are forecasting slippage, with five of the six most mature projects forecasting significant increases in the initial estimates for operating costs. Research Councils have not always sufficiently evaluated options for locating new scientific facilities and have had difficulty in attracting a sufficient number of bidders for contracts to help build new facilities. Performance indicators used by the Research Councils and project teams for monitoring the success of these facilities are not always sufficiently comprehensive or measurable, and if the UK is to maximise the value of these facilities, it needs to attract more young people into science to make good use of the research capacity now being built.