In my dissertation, I provide two models of joint contribution games that are relevant to the phenomenon of crowdfunding. I also provide a characterization of Bayes Nash equilibrium. In the first chapter I build a model of crowdfunding. An entrepreneur finances her project with common value via crowdfunding. She chooses a funding mechanism (fixed or flexible), a price, and a funding goal. Under fixed funding money is refunded if the goal is not met; under flexible funding the entrepreneur keeps the money. Backers observe signals about the value and decide whether to contribute or postpone purchase to the retail stage. The optimal crowdfunding campaign is characterized. When the entrepreneur has commitment power, fixed funding generates more revenue than flexible funding. When the entrepreneur has no commitment power, fixed funding serves as a commitment device to eliminate moral hazard In the second chapter I consider a dynamic contribution game under two regimes. The first regime is that all but the last rounds are cheap talk, the other is that in all rounds contribution is sunk. With binary contribution levels and a continuum of types we show that one of the monotone equilibria in the first regime implements the ex-post efficient and ex-post individually rational allocation when the cheap talk period is long enough. In contrast, when commitment is required, no equilibria achieves the same allocation. However, with a continuum of contribution levels, all equilibria of the contribution game with cheap talk will be the same as a one-shot game with no cheap talk, due to severe free riding. In this case, dynamic contribution with commitment provides credibility and can significantly improve efficiency. In the third chapter, coauthored with Ichiro Obara, we prove the following characterization regarding types and Bayes equilibrium actions they play across games: Given any two types in any two countable type spaces, if for all finite games, the two types have the same pure Bayes Nash equilibrium action, then there exists a bijective belief morphism between them. As an application, our result implies that the universal space for Bayes Nash equilibrium that retains non-redundancy does not exist.

'This short volume is very welcome . . . Most importantly, on pages 32-33, the volume reprints as an appendix to the journal article based on Nash's Princeton doctoral dissertation on non-cooperative games a section of the thesis on "motivation and interpretation" that was omitted from the article. An editorial note remarks mildly that "The missing section is of considerable interest". This section, not available in any other published source, makes the present volume indispensable for research libraries . . . Nash's Essays on Game Theory, dating from his years as a Princeton graduate student . . . has a lasting impact on economics and related fields unmatched by any series of articles written in such a brief time . . . To economists, his name will always bring to mind his game theory papers of the early 1950s. It is good to have these conveniently reprinted in this volume.' - Robert W. Dimand, The Economic Journal 'The news that John Nash was to share the 1994 Nobel Prize for Economics with John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten was doubly welcome. It signalled not only that the brilliant achievements of his youth were to be recognized in a manner consistent with their significance, but that the long illness that clouded his later years had fallen into remission. I hope that this collection of his economic papers will serve as another reminder that John Nash has rejoined the intellectual community to which he has contributed so much.' - From the introduction by Ken Binmore Essays on Game Theory is a unique collection of seven of John Nash's essays which highlight his pioneering contribution to game theory in economics. Featuring a comprehensive introduction by Ken Binmore which explains and summarizes John Nash's achievements in the field of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, this book will be an indispensable reference for scholars and will be welcomed by those with an interest in game theory and its applications to the social sciences.

'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.

Behavioural game theory is the most important recent development of standard game theory, and its applications regard several fields of research, ranging from economic theory to sociology and political science. Behavioural game theory aims to provide a behavioural and psychological approach to game theory modelling, in order to identify more robust equilibrium outcomes and more realistic behavioural assumptions. This book explores the key topics in detail, covering issues such as players' heterogeneity, social preferences, reciprocity, learning and information, and punishment in public good games. It provides a state-of-the-art analysis of the progress and methodology of behavioural game theory, as well as exploring the interdisciplinary aspects of the subject, and is an extremely valuable resource for academics and scholars with an interest in the area. Book jacket.

This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.