This thesis studies three distinct problems of organizational design and regulation. The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of partnership dissolution mechanisms when partners face limited financial resources. Those mechanisms cover a large range of applications such as termination of joint ventures, bankruptcy procedures, divorce or, land reallocation. The work presents an existence condition of first-best dissolution mechanisms with financially-constrained partners as well as a methodology to implement those mechanisms in practice. It is shown that a well-balanced distribution of initial ownership rights and financial resources among partners is crucial for the existence of the first-best solution - more extreme distributions generally lead to a failure of negotiations on efficient dissolution. Second-best mechanisms are also investigated as well as generalizations to richer settings. The second chapter considers the optimal regulation of firms whose activity may be harmful to society. The analysis focuses on determining whether monetary punishments should target more the owner of the firm or the employee in charge of taking precautionary measures. When the employee has limited financial resources, the analysis shows that monetary punishments should be imposed solely on the owner of the firm if the regulator wants the firm to take appropriate precautionary measures. An extension to the case of two financially-constrained individuals jointly in charge of safety shows that monetary punishments should be evenly distributed among the two injurers. The third chapter addresses the issue of regulating airports. It sheds light on the importance of jointly regulating the price of aeronautical services, the one for commercial services offered at the airport as well as the level of investment chosen by the airport. An investigation of traditional regulations shows that they generally fail to implement the optimal regulation as they do not provide sufficient incentives to invest. A corrective regulation is proposed to tackle this issue. The consequences of the nature of the airport-airline relationship and the observability of investment on the optimal regulation are also investigated.