Originally published in 1948. In the first essay of this collection, Lovejoy reflects on the nature, methods, and difficulties of the historiography of ideas. He maps out recurring phenomena in the history of ideas, which the essays illustrate. One phenomenon is the presence and influence of the same presuppositions or other operative "ideas" in very diverse provinces of thought and in different periods. Another is the role of semantic transitions and confusions, of shifts and of ambiguities in the meanings of terms, in the history of thought and taste. A third phenomenon is the internal tensions or waverings in the mind of almost every individual writer—sometimes discernible even in a single writing or on a single page—arising from conflicting ideas or incongruous propensities of feeling or taste to which the writer is susceptible. These essays do not contribute to metaphysical and epistemological questions; they are primarily historical.

In this outstanding collection of essays, Isaiah Berlin, one of the great thinkers of the twentieth century, discusses the importance of dissenters in the history of ideas--among them Machiavelli, Vico, Montesquieu, Herzen, and Sorel. With his unusual powers of imaginative re-creation, Berlin brings to life original minds that swam against the current of their times--and still challenge conventional wisdom. In a new foreword to this corrected edition, which also includes a new appendix of letters in which Berlin discusses and further illuminates some of its topics, noted essayist Mark Lilla argues that Berlin's decision to give up a philosophy fellowship and become a historian of ideas represented not an abandonment of philosophy but a decision to do philosophy by other, perhaps better, means. "His instinct told him," Lilla writes, "that you learn more about an idea as an idea when you know something about its genesis and understand why certain people found it compelling and were spurred to action by it." This collection of fascinating intellectual portraits is a rich demonstration of that belief.

Lectures delivered as a series at Johns Hopkins University during 1982-83.

Softbound - New, softbound print book.

"Here, for the first time in English, are the philosophical essays - including the first statement of the "Duhem Thesis" - that formed the basis for Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, together with new translations of the historiographical essays presenting the equally celebrated "Continuity Thesis" by Pierre Duhem (1861-1916), a founding figure of the history and philosophy of science. Prefaced by an introduction on Duhem's intellectual development and continuing significance, here as well are important subsequent essays in which Duhem elaborated key concepts and critiqued such contemporaries as Henri Poincare and Ernst Mach. Together, these works offer a lively picture of the state of science at the turn of the century while addressing methodological issues that remain at the center of debate today."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

Selected essays of arguably the greatest and most influential historian of ideas of modern times.

What has postmodernism got to do with Christianity? To what extent can a nihilist derive an ethic from the history of a religion? Can a western approach to secularisation be applied to Islam? These questions are central to this collection of essays from 2011–2015 by Matthew Edward Harris. The essays are grouped around the interrelated themes of religion, ethics and the history of ideas and constitute a critically constructive approach to the subject matter. Harris defends Vattimo against some of his more strident critics, but nevertheless poses questions of his own. Along with a new introduction, outlining Vattimo’s life, thought and ideas, and a conclusion, which looks at how developments in Vattimo’s views on religion have wider implications for his ‘weak thought,’ the volume includes nine essays on Vattimo’s thought. Harris’ overall argument is that Vattimo is overly reliant upon history and that there is a contradiction within his style of ‘weak thought,’ which is against definitive pronouncements yet excludes outright anything that does not pertain to the history of linguistic messages.