In this book, Per Skedinger gives an excellent and balanced survey and evaluation of both the theoretical prediction and the empirical research about the consequences of legislated employment protection. From the foreword by Assar Lindbeck Employment protection legislation is one of the most controversial issues in the labour market. In this insightful book, Per Skedinger provides an overview of the design, evolution and research on the effects of employment protection legislation around the world. Most countries have some form of employment protection legislation. Against a background of high and rising unemployment in many countries, politicians and representatives of unions and businesses often have differing views as to the desirability, effects and distributional consequences of the legislation. The book covers more than one hundred international studies, dealing with the impact of legislation on productivity, personnel turnover, structural change, perceived job security, and the aggregate level and distribution of employment and unemployment. Being the first comprehensive and up-to-date survey available of economic research on the effects of employment protection, this book will appeal to researchers in economics, industrial relations and law, as well as to policymakers and practitioners dealing with employment protection issues in government, business and trade unions.

The OECD Employment Outlook 2013 looks at labour markets in the wake of the crisis. It also includes chapters employment protection legislation; benefit systems, employment and training programmes and re-employment earnings and skills afer job loss.

The 2017 edition of the OECD Employment Outlook reviews recent labour market trends and short-term prospects in OECD countries.

"The United States Code is the official codification of the general and permanent laws of the United States of America. The Code was first published in 1926, and a new edition of the code has been published every six years since 1934. The 2012 edition of the Code incorporates laws enacted through the One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, the last of which was signed by the President on January 15, 2013. It does not include laws of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, enacted between January 2, 2013, the date it convened, and January 15, 2013. By statutory authority this edition may be cited "U.S.C. 2012 ed." As adopted in 1926, the Code established prima facie the general and permanent laws of the United States. The underlying statutes reprinted in the Code remained in effect and controlled over the Code in case of any discrepancy. In 1947, Congress began enacting individual titles of the Code into positive law. When a title is enacted into positive law, the underlying statutes are repealed and the title then becomes legal evidence of the law. Currently, 26 of the 51 titles in the Code have been so enacted. These are identified in the table of titles near the beginning of each volume. The Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives continues to prepare legislation pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 285b to enact the remainder of the Code, on a title-by-title basis, into positive law. The 2012 edition of the Code was prepared and published under the supervision of Ralph V. Seep, Law Revision Counsel. Grateful acknowledgment is made of the contributions by all who helped in this work, particularly the staffs of the Office of the Law Revision Counsel and the Government Printing Office"--Preface.

Labor market deregulation, intended to boost productivity and employment, is one plausible, yet little studied, driver of the decline in labor shares that took place across most advanced economies since the early 1990s. This paper assesses the impact of job protection deregulation in a sample of 26 advanced economies over the period 1970-2015, using a newly constructed dataset of major reforms to employment protection legislation for regular contracts. We apply the local projection method to estimate the dynamic response of the labor share to our reform events at both the country and the country-industry levels. For the latter, we employ a differences-in-differences identification strategy using two identifying assumptions grounded in theory—namely that job protection deregulation should have larger negative effects in industries characterized by (i) a higher “natural” propensity to adjust the workforce, and (ii) a lower elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. We find a statistically significant, economically large and robust negative effect of deregulation on the labor share. In particular, illustrative back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that job protection deregulation may have contributed about 15 percent to the average labor share decline in advanced economies. Together with existing evidence regarding the macroeconomic gains from job protection and other labor market reforms, our results also point to the need for policymakers to address efficiency-equity trade-offs when designing such reforms.