Embodied Idealism argues that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's early thought - primarily as found in The Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception - stands as a form of transcendental idealism. This interpretation runs against the grain of much of the Merleau-Ponty scholarship, and opposing interpretations are not without support. Merleau-Ponty is at points highly critical of idealism in his early works. Also, his emphasis on embodiment would seem to run counter to the idealist view that the mental is central to reality. Joseph Berendzen shows that these points can be accommodated within a transcendental idealist interpretation. Merleau-Ponty's overt criticisms of idealism are aimed at specific aspects of idealist theories that are not obligatory aspects of idealism in general. Rather, his critique is typically aimed at a specific version of intellectualist idealism associated with his teacher Léon Brunschvicg. In spite of his overt criticisms of idealism, Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy holds that our experience is inextricably structured by our minds. Furthermore, he holds that reality is ontologically dependent on the mind, yet in a manner that also allows for a sense in which reality is mind-independent. It is crucial to this interpretation that Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on embodiment leads to a unique view of embodied consciousness and subjectivity that supports a novel form of idealism, rather than motivating an anti-idealist position. Thus, his transcendental idealism is genuinely an embodied idealism.

Embodied Idealism argues that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's early thought - primarily as found in The Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception - stands as a form of transcendental idealism. This interpretation runs against the grain of much of the Merleau-Ponty scholarship, and opposing interpretations are not without support. Merleau-Ponty is at points highly critical of idealism in his early works. Also, his emphasis on embodiment would seem to run counter to the idealist view that the mental is central to reality. Joseph Berendzen shows that these points can be accommodated within a transcendental idealist interpretation. Merleau-Ponty's overt criticisms of idealism are aimed at specific aspects of idealist theories that are not obligatory aspects of idealism in general. Rather, his critique is typically aimed at a specific version of intellectualist idealism associated with his teacher Léon Brunschvicg. In spite of his overt criticisms of idealism, Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy holds that our experience is inextricably structured by our minds. Furthermore, he holds that reality is ontologically dependent on the mind, yet in a manner that also allows for a sense in which reality is mind-independent. It is crucial to this interpretation that Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on embodiment leads to a unique view of embodied consciousness and subjectivity that supports a novel form of idealism, rather than motivating an anti-idealist position. Thus, his transcendental idealism is genuinely an embodied idealism.

'Embodied Idealism' argues that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's early thought stands as a form of transcendental idealism. In spite of his overt criticisms of idealism, Merleau-Ponty holds that our experience is inextricably structured by our minds, and that reality is ontologically dependent on the mind.

Perhaps not since Ralph Tyler's (1949) Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction has a book communicated the field as completely as Understanding Curriculum. From historical discourses to breaking developments in feminist, poststructuralist, and racial theory, including chapters on political theory, phenomenology, aesthetics, theology, international developments, and a lengthy chapter on institutional concerns, the American curriculum field is here. It will be an indispensable textbook for undergraduate and graduate courses alike.

When it comes to contemporary philosophical problems, metaphysical idealism-or Berkeleyan immaterialism-is not taken seriously by most philosophers, not to mention the typical Christian layperson. This state of affairs deserves some attempt at rectification, since Idealism has considerable explanatory power as a metaphysical thesis and provides numerous practical and theoretical benefits. Such thinkers as George Berkeley and Jonathan Edwards believed that Idealism is especially amenable to a Christian perspective, both because it provides a plausible way of conceptualizing the world from a theistic standpoint and because it effectively addresses skeptical challenges to the Christian faith. The contributors to this volume explore a variety of ways in which the case can be made for this claim, including potential solutions to philosophical problems related to the nature of time, the ontology of physical objects, the mind-body problem, and the nature of science.

Embodied cognition often challenges standard cognitive science. In this outstanding introduction, Lawrence Shapiro sets out the central themes and debates surrounding embodied cognition, explaining and assessing the work of many of the key figures in the field, including George Lakoff, Alva Noë, Andy Clark, and Arthur Glenberg. Beginning with an outline of the theoretical and methodological commitments of standard cognitive science, Shapiro then examines philosophical and empirical arguments surrounding the traditional perspective. He introduces topics such as dynamic systems theory, ecological psychology, robotics, and connectionism, before addressing core issues in philosophy of mind such as mental representation and extended cognition. Including helpful chapter summaries and annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, Embodied Cognition is essential reading for all students of philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science.

Angelica Nuzzo offers a comprehensive reconstruction of Kant's theory of sensibility in his three Critiques. By introducing the notion of "transcendental embodiment," Nuzzo proposes a new understanding of Kant's views on science, nature, morality, and art. She shows that the issue of human embodiment is coherently addressed and key to comprehending vexing issues in Kant's work as a whole. In this penetrating book, Nuzzo enters new terrain and takes on questions Kant struggled with: How does a body that feels pleasure and pain, desire, anger, and fear understand and experience reason and strive toward knowledge? What grounds the body's experience of art and beauty? What kind of feeling is the feeling of being alive? As she comes to grips with answers, Nuzzo goes beyond Kant to revise our view of embodiment and the essential conditions that make human experience possible.