"Historians and sliders have not been kind to either [General Douglas] MacArthur or the soldiers whom he placed in harm's way in the summer of 1950 ... This study seeks to redress the imbalance that exists between fact and interpretation. For too long historians and soldiers have roundly criticized Task Force Smith's performance, extrapolated from its fate a set of assumptions about what constitutes readiness, and then used those assumptions to condemn the entire Eighth Army. The reality is much more complex. A proper examination of the historical record reveals wide disparities in the readiness and combat effectiveness of the subordinate units of America's first forward-deployed Cold War field force ... This work will demonstrate how units achieved that readiness by means of case studies of four infantry regiments, one from each of the four infantry divisions that constituted the Eighth Army in 1950. It synthesizes contemporary training doctrine, training records generated by maneuver units, unit histories, reports of inspections by outside agencies, contemporary self-assessments, and the observations of veterans who served in Japan in the fifteen months before the outbreak of the Korean War. It challenges the long-standing reputation of the Eighth Army as flabby, dispirited, and weak"--Introduction.

With the historian's eye for detail and context and the novelist's ken for an exciting story, Ed Evanhoe captures the seat-of-the-pants evolution of a motley group of Americans and Britons. Larger-than-life characters, they came from the U.S. military and the OSS, from the British Special Air Service and Jedburghs. Evanhoe lets the reader in on their training with Korean volunteers and their movement north, overland and by boat and parachute as well as in the first helicopter operations. Their unorthodox procedures, weapons, and tactics, he shows, led to great successes and tragic mistakes, both of which are examined in this warts-and-all approach.

Military professionals and theorists have long understood the relevance of morale in war. Montgomery, the victor at El Alamein, said, following the battle, that 'the more fighting I see, the more I am convinced that the big thing in war is morale'. Jonathan Fennell, in examining the North African campaign through the lens of morale, challenges conventional explanations for Allied success in one of the most important and controversial campaigns in British and Commonwealth history. He introduces new sources, notably censorship summaries of soldiers' mail, and an innovative methodology that assesses troop morale not only on the evidence of personal observations and official reports but also on contemporaneously recorded rates of psychological breakdown, sickness, desertion and surrender. He shows for the first time that a major morale crisis and stunning recovery decisively affected Eighth Army's performance during the critical battles on the Gazala and El Alamein lines in 1942.

The US 8th Air Force was based in the UK from 1942 onwards, spread exclusively across East Anglia and operating from over 40 locations. The remains of some of these sites can still be found and a few are still airfields. The 8th flew intensive bomber and fighter sorties over Europe. Over 2000 aircraft, mostly B-17s, B-26s and P-47s, involving 150,000 men and a vastly sophisticated supply chain, were engaged in a ceaseless war of high-altitude daylight precision bombing that did much to secure eventual Allied success.

Eighth Army, Britain's most famous field army of the twentieth century, landed in Italy in September 1943 and fought continously until the defeat of the Germans in early-May 1945. This book studies the experience of Eighth Army in the Italian campaign, examining how a force accustomed to the open spaces of North Africa adjusted to the difficult terrain of Italy where fighting became much more a matter for the infantry than for the armour. It also compares the qualities of the commanders of Eighth Army in Italy: Montgomery; Leese and, finally, McCreery. The book uses official records at various levels, personal accounts - some never before published - and published material to present a picture of an army that, although defined as British, was one of the war's most cosmopolitan formations. Its soldiers came from the UK, Canada, India, Ireland, Nepal, New Zealand, Poland and South Africa as well as from Palestine - the Jewish Brigade - and from Italy itself.

Operations research grew out of the application of the scientific method to certain problems of war during World War II. This book tells the story of how operations research became an important activity in the Eighth Air Force. It emphasizes the people involved in these historical events, rather than the technical matters with which they dealt.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.