Eighth Air Force (8AF) conducted the US's first thousand-bomber raids against Germany in February 1944--recorded in history as Big Week. Until that time the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) was not able to concentrate such firepower on the enemy in such a short period of time. It took much effort to make Big Week "big" covering the spectrum of planning and execution activities dating back to the end of World War I that were adapted and flexed to be successful in a different context. Indeed, the depth and breadth of the preparations required to successfully execute Big Week on the scale intended is deserving of a closer examination. Sources include books and periodicals from the Fairchild Library and the Air Command and Staff College curriculum as well as several primary source documents from the archives of the Air Force Historical Research Agency. Information from 1918 through 1947 was reviewed and analyzed in order to produce a thorough review of the components within the operational art element of logistics and the contextual elements that influenced preparations for and execution of Big Week. Leadership from President Roosevelt to first line supervisors influenced 8AF logistics before February 1944. Major General Hugh J. Knerr was the one man that stood out as the champion of USAAF logistics. He influenced the concept of logistical operations in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) and, more specifically, put logistics on a level of importance equal to that of operations within the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF). He synchronized logistics with operations and strove for constant improvement by making organizational and process changes aimed at increasing logistical responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency.

Eighth Air Force (8AF) conducted the US’s first thousand-bomber raids against Germany in February 1944—recorded in history as Big Week. Until that time the USAAF was not able to concentrate such firepower on the enemy in such a short period of time. It took much effort to make Big Week “big” covering the spectrum of planning and execution activities dating back to the end of World War I that were adapted and flexed to be successful in a different context. Indeed, the depth and breadth of the preparations required to successfully execute Big Week on the scale intended is deserving of a closer examination. Leadership from President Roosevelt to first line supervisors influenced 8AF logistics before February 1944. Major General Hugh J. Knerr was the one man that stood out as the champion of USAAF logistics. He influenced the concept of logistical operations in the ETO and, more specifically, put logistics on a level of importance equal to that of operations within the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF). He synchronized logistics with operations and strove for constant improvement by making organizational and process changes aimed at increasing logistical responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency. The British provided tremendous host nation support including construction of new airfields, skilled and unskilled labor support, supply items, and transportation. The British host nation support 8AF received far surpassed what a cursory review of World War II history leads one to believe and serves as a model for US-led coalition operations in the 21st century. The US Merchant Marine and US Navy provided sealift of goods from the stateside depots to the theater. The US Army provided supply support of common items and Air Service Command (ASC) provided technical and supply support. Last, but not least, both civil servants and civilian contractors provided depot maintenance and in-theater technical support.

When America entered World War II in 1941, it was first left to the Army Air Forces to take the fight to Germany. In January 1942 the US Eighth Air Force was created and ordered to England, even though it was without men, equipment, or airplanes. This is the story of Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker’s two years with VIII Bomber Command and later as commander of the Eighth, as he worked to grow it into a force capable of striking German targets from above twenty thousand feet. Initially promised one hundred airplanes and the men to fly them, he soon discovered “his” bombers were often diverted to the North Africa and Pacific theaters. Along the way Eaker faced other critical issues, including atrocious weather, heavy casualties, and the absence of escort fighters. Meanwhile, the head of the Army Air Forces, General “Hap” Arnold, clashed with and criticized Eaker for not flying more missions with more airplanes. Ultimately, as the air war unfolded, the war of words behind the scenes continued until the generals reached a point of irreconcilable differences and Arnold relieved Eaker of command. In spite of this, the “Mighty Eighth Air Force” continued to pummel the Germans. Not once, not even in the two absolute worst air battles of the war—the Schweinfurt missions of 1943, each of which cost one of every four bombers and six hundred–plus men for each mission—did the Eighth ever turn back before reaching their target. Not until after the first two years was there a fighter that could escort the heavy bombers, the B-17s and B-24s, even partway into Germany, much less to targets near the Vienna border, and return. The story of the first two years of the “Mighty Eighth Air Force” in many senses presents an even stronger case for heroism, dedication, and simple self-sacrifice than that depicting events in the final seventeen months.