An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.

Every day we make intuitive decisions—from the mundane choice of what clothes to wear to more important issues such as which new car "feels right" or which person would be "good" for a particular job. To varying degrees, logic plays a role in these decisions, but at a certain point all of us rely on intuition, our sixth sense. Is this the right way to decide? Should we trust our gut feelings? When intuition conflicts with logic, what should we do? In Educating Intuition, Robin M. Hogarth lays bare this mysterious process so fundamental to daily life by offering the first comprehensive overview of what the science of psychology can tell us about intuition—where it comes from, how it works, whether we can trust it. From this literature and his own research, Hogarth finds that intuition is a normal and important component of thought that has its roots in processes of tacit learning. Environment, attention, experience, expertise, and the success of the scientific method all form part of Hogarth's perspective on intuition, leading him to the surprising—but natural—conclusion that we can educate our sixth sense. To this end he offers concrete suggestions and exercises to help readers develop their intuitive skills and habits for learning the "right" lessons from experience. Artfully and accessibly combining cognitive science, the latest research in psychology, and Hogarth's own observations, Educating Intuition eschews the vague approach to the topic that has become commonplace and provides instead a wholly engaging and practical guide to enhancing our intuitive skills.

An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.

From Mark Quirk, recipient of the 2006 Society of Teachers of Family Medicine's Excellence in Education award, comes the latest on improving medical education. In this volume, Quirk explores metacognition, the idea that we can think about the way we or other people think, and thus gain a better understanding of ourselves, our own cognitive processes, and the patients we seek to help. Written for medical educators--from medical school faculty to residents--this book will help you teach your students and interns how to extrapolate lessons from experience and integrate learning and practice. It will help them to think more clearly and thoroughly about what they read, hear, and learn on a day-to-day basis and thus become more informed and humanistic doctors.

In writing the present book I have had in mind the following objectives: - To propose a theoretical, comprehensive view of the domain of intuition. - To identify and organize the experimental findings related to intuition scattered in a wide variety of research contexts. - To reveal the educational implications of the idea, developed for science and mathematics education. Most of the existing monographs in the field of intuition are mainly concerned with theoretical debates - definitions, philosophical attitudes, historical considerations. (See, especially the works of Wild (1938), of Bunge (1 962) and of Noddings and Shore (1 984).) A notable exception is the book by Westcott (1968), which combines theoretical analyses with the author’s own experimental studies. But, so far, no attempt has been made to identify systematically those findings, spread throughout the research literature, which could contribute to the deciphering of the mechanisms of intuition. Very often the relevant studies do not refer explicitly to intuition. Even when this term is used it occurs, usually, as a self-evident, common sense term.

As children, we would have spilt glasses of milk, dropped things, and broken things. As children, therefore, we would have developed intuitions about how the world ‘works’, but we would not necessarily have been able to explain these ‘workings’. It would only have been till we entered formal schooling that we would have learned codifications of canon within each respective discipline, and consequently how to articulate the canon to explain the intuition. The preceding example was from the natural sciences, but one could just have easily taken an example from, say, the environmental sciences or from the social sciences. Indeed, much of this book does just that, as it seeks to chart the territory of a new theory of learning around Disciplinary Intuitions. Many of the chapters within draw frequent and explicit linkages to curriculum design, from the premise of the need to go beyond addressing the conceptions of learners, to seeking to understand the substrate upon which these conceptions are founded. The argument is made that this substrate comprises the particular set of lived experiences of each learner, and how – because these lived experiences are as tacit as they are diverse – designing curriculum around misconceptions and preconceptions alone would not lead to enduring understanding from first principles. From this perspective, Disciplinary Intuitions constitute an exciting field at the nexus of learning theories and curriculum design.